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NOTE
THE COURT, THE BAR, AND CERTIORARI
AT OCTOBER TERM, 1958 *
I. INTROIDUCTION
Twenty-three years ago, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote,
"I think that it is safe to say that about 60 percent of the applications for
certiorari are wholly without merit and ought never to have been made.
There are probably about 20 percent or so in addition which have a fair
degree of plausibility but which fail to survive critical examination. The
remainder, falling short, I believe, of 20 percent, show substantial grounds
and are granted. I think that it is the view of the members of the Court
that if any error is made in dealing with these applications it is on the side
of liberality." ' In 1958 a member of the Court remarked, "of the total
petitions acted on I think it must be said that more than one-half were so
untenable that they never should have been filed." 2 It is the purpose of this
Note to examine the United States Supreme Court docket for October
Term, 1958, as a representative year, in the light of the above statements.
Professors Frankfurter and Fisher have stated that "only by quarrying in
the hundreds of dreary petitions for certiorari which have been denied could
pedantic demonstration be made of some of the niggling points, or issues
long since at rest, on which the bar seeks the Court's reviewing power." 3
Essentially, this is what has been done.4
* This Note is the result of a study made possible by funds provided by the Insti-
tute of Legal Research of the University of Pennsylvania for a research project under-
taken by the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance and kind cooperation of the
following persons: James R. Browning, Clerk of the Supreme Court; Richard J.
Blanchard, Deputy Clerk; William M. Allison, Assistant Clerk; Michael Rodak, Jr.,
Assistant Clerk; Helen Newman, Librarian of the Supreme Court; H. Charles Hallam,
Jr., Assistant Librarian; Oscar H. Davis, First Assistant to the Solicitor General;
Winifred S. Phillips, Librarian of the Philadelphia Bar Association; Sidney B. Hill,
Acting Librarian, Biddle Law Library, - University of Pennsylvania Law School;
Arthur A. Charpentier, Librarian, The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York; Earl C. Borgeson, Librarian, Harvard Law School Library.
I S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1937) (letter from Charles Evans
Hughes to Senator Wheeler).
2 Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 REcORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 541, 547 (1958).
3 Frankfurter & Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Terms,
1935 and 1936, 51 HARV. L. REv. 577, 594 (1938).
4 For cases on writ of certiorari on the appellate docket which were granted or
denied at October Term, 1958, the petitions for certiorari and briefs in opposition
were read; for appeal cases on the appellate docket in which probable jurisdiction was
noted or postponed, or which were summarily dismissed or affirmed at October Term,
1958, the jurisdictional statement and the motion to affirm or dismiss were read. In
addition, all cases on the appellate docket which were dismissed pursuant to U.S.
SUr. CT. R. 60 (by stipulation of the parties) were similarly treated. Furthermore,
a sampling of approximately 100 cases was taken from the miscellaneous docket,
October Term, 1958.
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II. MAJOR STANDARDS GOVERNING REVIEW
The standards adopted by the Supreme Court in granting certiorari
have been set forth in its Rule 19: r first, has the state or federal court
decided an important federal question not yet determined by the Supreme
Court; and second, have the courts of appeals conflicted on the same ques-
tion, or is the court of appeals in conflict with state law on an important
state question, or has the court of appeals decided a question so as to
conflict with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, or has the state
court decided a federal question "in a way probably not in accord" with
decisions of the Court. The following sections will examine the Court's
application of these standards to the petitions presented.
A. Conflicts
Mr. Justice Harlan has said that "the most assured way of satisfying
the requirement of Rule 19 is to show the issue sought to be reviewed
involves a conflict of decisions among the lower federal courts on a point
of federal law." 8 That this is recognized by those seeking the Court's
review is apparent from an examination of the petitions: as has been noted
in prior years,7 an overwhelming majority allege the existence of a conflict
of some nature.
1. Direct Conflict
Of all cases in which writ of certiorari was granted, about one-third
contained an actual conflict. These ranged in terms of importance from
whether small loan companies are exempted from the Fair Labor Standards
Act 8 to the lesser question of whether, in a civil suit by the United
States seeking double damages for fraudulent transactions in surplus prop-
erty, the action is barred by a five-year statute of limitations. 9 Although
5 The statutory authority for the Court's appellate jurisdiction is contained in
28 U.S.C. §§ 1252-57 (1958). For a sharp criticism of Rule 19's value as a guide to
the bar, see Harper & Pratt, What The Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1951
Term, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 439, 440 (1953).
GHarlan, Some Aspects of the Judicial Process in the Supreme Court of the
United States, 33 Ausm. L.J. 108, 111 (1959).
7 Harper & Liebowitz, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1952
Term, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 427, 443, 455 (1954).
852 Stat. 1067 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (2) (1958). The Sixth
Circuit said yes on this question in Mitchell v. Kentucky Fin. Co., 254 F.2d 8 (6th Cir.
1958) ; the First Circuit reached an opposite result in Aetna Fin. Co. v. Mitchell,
247 F.2d 190 (1st Cir. 1957). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the former
case, 358 U.S. 811 (1958), and reversed, 359 U.S. 290 (1959).
9 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1958). This question turned on whether the statute was to
be characterized as penal or remedial. The Court of Claims, in Erie Basin Metal
Prods., Inc. v. United States, 138 Ct. Cl. 67, 150 F. Supp. 561 (1957), said that the
statute was penal and held that the Government was barred by the statute of limita-
tions. Conversely, in United States v. Doman, 255 F.2d 865 (1958), suit was brought
nine years after the transaction and the Third Circuit, finding the statute remedial
in nature, held the action not untimely. Certiorari was granted in the latter case
stb nom. Koller v. United States, 358 U.S. 892 (1958), and the Supreme Court
affirmed per curiam, 359 U.S. 309 (1959).
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the presence of conflict is often acknowledged by the Court as its basis
for granting certiorari,' in certain cases it has gone unmentioned: in Glus
v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal,"- the Second Circuit held that the Federal
Employers' Liability Act statute of limitations 12 is not tolled despite the
fact that the employee relied upon misrepresentations by his employer as
to the applicable period. While this was in direct conflict with the Fourth
Circuit,1 3 the Supreme Court's stated reason for granting certiorari was
that "the question is important and recurrent." 14 In Green v. McElroy,'5
the District of Columbia Circuit's approval of government procedures in
industrial security clearance cases was apparently in conflict with the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Parker v. Lester.16 There was no stated reason for
the granting of the petition in this case. Although the granting of certiorari
in these cases could easily be explained on the importance of the issue,
the Court's failure to enunciate the conflict as a distinct ground for the
grant is difficult to explain.
Notwithstanding what has been said, the existence of an intercircuit
conflict does not insure the granting of certiorari.17 This is significantly
illustrated in prior litigation of the question presented by Melrose Distillers,
Inc. v. United States: 18 whether dissolution of a corporation under state
corporation laws abates a pending federal criminal prosecution against the
corporation. In United States v. United States Vanadium Corp.,'9 the
Tenth Circuit had held that the prosecution was abated under Delaware
law; this was in direct conflict with a previous holding of the Seventh
Circuit.20  The Government's petition for certiorari in Vanadium was
denied; 21 however, in the instant case, without opposition from the Gov-
ernment, 22 Melrose's petition was granted 23 and the issue was finally
10 E.g., NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 210 (1959); Robert C. Herd
& Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 300 (1959).
"l 253 F.2d 957 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 359 U.S. 231 (1959).
12 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1958).
13 Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 178 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 919 (1950).
14 359 U.S. 231, 232 (1959).
15 254 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1958), rev'd, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
16227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955). For further assertion of the conflict, see 46
CALIF. L. Rxv. 828 (1958).
17 See Stern, Denial of Certiorari Despite a Conflict, 66 HARv. L. REv. 465
(1953). But see Roehner & Roehner, Certiorari-What is a Conflict Between
Circuits, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 656 (1953).
18359 U.S. 271 (1959), affirming 258 F.2d 726 (4th Cir. 1958).
'0 230 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1956).
20 United States v. P. F. Collier & Son, 208 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1953).
21351 U.S. 939 (1956).
22 The significance of the Government's request to grant certiorari is discussed
generally at note 401 infra and accompanying text. For cases in prior terms where
the Court has denied certiorari despite lack of Government opposition see Coplon v.
United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952);
United States v. Community Serv., Inc., 189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 932 (1952).
23 358 U.S. 878 (1958).
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resolved by the Supreme Court in favor of the Government.2- 4 It thus
appears that "an issue for which certiorari once seemed inopportune may,
through the accumulation of similar instances or in the clearer perspective
of the ramifications of the particular problem, later emerge as obviously
important." 25
In Zipp v. Commissioner,26 the question was whether remaining stock-
holders in a closely held corporation receive a taxable dividend upon the
complete redemption by the corporation of a former stockholder's shares.27
The Sixth Circuit answered in the affirmative, directly contrary to a
contemporary Third Circuit holding.28 Because of the importance of the
question in the administration of the Internal Revenue Code, the propriety
of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in this case may be open to
criticism. The issue raised in NLRB v. Southern Bleachery & Print
Works, Inc.29 was whether the exercise as well as the possession of super-
visory authority was necessary in order to qualify for exemption as a
"supervisor" under the Taft-Hartley Act. 0  The Fourth Circuit held that
it was; the First 31 and Sixth 8 2 Circuits had previously held that possession
alone was sufficient. Despite the denial of certiorari this problem appears
worthy of the Court's attention. In Seven-Up Co. v. Blue Note, Inc.,
33
the question was whether, in a diversity action for damages and injunctive
relief for trade name infringement, the jurisdictional amount is to be meas-
ured by the total value of the property right sought to be protected or by
only the amount of alleged damage to that property right. The Seventh
Circuit decided that the latter must be shown, the Third Circuit 3 4 to the
contrary notwithstanding. The volume of litigation concerning this issue
and its apparent uncertainty 35 would seem to militate toward Supreme
Court resolution.
In Missouri Pac. R.R. v. H. Rouw Co.,36 the issue was whether the
difference between the selling commission which a shipper would have paid
24 359 U.S. 271 (1959).
2
5 Frankfurter & Fisher, supra note 3, at 598.
26259 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 934 (1959).
27 See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 247, § 115(g) (1), as amended, ch. 994, 64 Stat.
931 (1950) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302(d)).
2
8 Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958). For further assertion
of the conflict see Singer, Tax Consequences of Stock Redemptions for Shareholders
Whose Stock is Not Redeemed, 38 ORE. L. REv. 1 (1958).
29257 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 911 (1959).
30 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), (11) (1958).
31 NLRB v. Leland-Gifford Co., 200 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1952).
32 Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 899
(1949).
33 260 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959).
34 Ambassador East, Inc. v. Orsatti, Inc., 257 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1958).
33 See cases cited in both the Seventh and Third Circuit opinions.
36258 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929 (1959).
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had the goods been sold at full price and the lesser commissions which
shipper actually paid when selling defective goods at a reduced price should
decrease the carrier's liability for damages under the Interstate Commerce
Act.3 7  The Fifth Circuit, in holding for the carrier, recognized that the
opposite result had been reached by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals.3
8
Irrespective of the seeming importance of this problem, the Supreme Court's
Rule 19 makes no provision for the granting of certiorari on conflict be-
tween a court of appeals and a state court on a federal question. Even so,
however, the Court has seen fit on many occasions in the past to grant
review when such a conflict emerged.3 9 In Delaware v. Clurran,4° the peti-
tioner argued that he was denied a fair trial under the fourteenth amendment
when perjured testimony was used against him without the actual knowl-
edge of the prosecuting attorney. The Third Circuit affirmed the granting
of federal habeas corpus in this case, while four other circuits have held no
violation of due process occurs when the prosecuting attorney is without
actual knowledge.41 A possible distinction in the instant case was the fact
that the perjurer was a high-ranking police officer. Nevertheless, the law
appears to be in a state of confusion 42 and a decision by the Supreme Court
would seem to be desirable. The issue presented by Ferraiolo v. Newman 
43
was whether the acquisition of stock by exercise of conversion rights could
be considered a "purchase" under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 4 Holding that under the facts presented there was no
"purchase," the Sixth Circuit distinguished a prior decision of the Second
Circuit 45 by characterizing the acquisition in that case as being "volun-
tary" in view of the market conditions there existing. However, if section
16(b) is to be considered a prophylactic rule which admits only of an
objective standard, the voluntariness of the conversion is irrelevant and
the cases are clearly in conflict.46 Urging this view upon the Court, the
3734 Stat. 593 (1906), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §20(11) (1958).
3 8 Texas & N.O.R.R. v. H. Rouw Co., 271 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1954); Thompson v. H. Rouw Co., 237 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Ct Civ. App. 1951). In
both of these cases, review was denied by the Supreme Court of Texas. (The cases,
although involving the same shipper, are unrelated.)
39 See generally ROBERTSON & KIRKHAm, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES § 329 (2d ed. Wolfson & Kurland 1951).
40 259 F.2d 707 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 948 (1958).
41 United States v. Jakalski, 237 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Coggins v. O'Brien,
188 F.2d 130 (1st Cir. 1951); Wild v. Oklahoma, 187 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1951);
Schectman v. Foster, 172 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950).
42 See generally Note, Perjured Testimony: Its Effect on Criminal Defendant's
Constitutional Rights, 7 DUKE L.J. 150 (1958).
43 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
4448 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958). Section 16(b) seeks to deter stock
manipulations by corporate insiders through rendering them liable to the corporation
for profits realized by purchase and sale within six months.
45 Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
761 (1947).
46 For discussion of this analysis see 107 U. PA. L. REv. 719 (1959). See also
72 HAv. L. REv. 1392 (1959).
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Government filed a memorandum in support of the petition for certiorari.
However, the issue appears to have arisen only these two times in twenty-
five years,47 and this may explain the Court's refusal to hear the case.
48
Other direct conflicts in which certiorari was denied are susceptible
to more ready explanation. In Brown Paper Mill Co. v. Commissioner 49
and Crowell-Collier Publishing Co. v. Commissioner,50 the dispute involved
the availability of judicial review on determinations of excess profits tax
refunds under section 732(c) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code.51 The
Brown and Collier cases held them nonreviewable and, by the Government's
own admission in a memorandum to the Court, were directly in conflict with
the Ninth Circuit.5 2 Although not opposing the petition for certiorari, the
Government informed the Court that the Ninth Circuit had granted a
rehearing in the Helms case and there was a possibility that the conflict
might vanish.5 3  In Stedman Mfg. Co. v. Redman,54 the district court,55
in a patent infringement action against the lessee of machinery, also enjoined
the lessor who was not a named party but who in fact conducted the defense.
Only the lessee appealed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed on the ground that
the patent was valid. The petition for certiorari pointed to an Eighth
Circuit decision 5 6 which held that an unnamed party cannot be enjoined,
thus being in conflict with the district court decision in the instant case.
However, as was pointed out in the brief in opposition, petitioner did not
present this issue to the Fourth Circuit and therefore no conflict existed
between the circuits.
57
Another area of direct conflict acknowledged by the Court to be sub-
ject to review obtains where a state court or court of appeals decides a
federal question in a way not in accord with the applicable decisions of
the Supreme Court.58 In United States v. Hulley,59 the issue was whether
47 See Brief in Opposition, Ferraiolo v. Newman, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
48 Another important issue under § 16(b) was likewise refused review by the
Court. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 751 (1943).
49 255 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 906 (1958).
50 259 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 928 (1959).
51 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 732(c), added by ch. 10, 55 Stat. 26 (1941), as
amended.
52 Helms Bakeries v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1956). For subsequent
history of this case see note 53 infra.
53 The Ninth Circuit subsequently did reverse itself in the Helms case, thereby
eliminating the conflict. 263 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1959).
54257 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 928 (1959).
55 154 F. Supp. 378 (M.D.N.C. 1957).
56 S. S. Kresge Co. v. Winget Kickernick Co., 96 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939).
57 Conflict between a court of appeals and a district court is clearly not meritorious
of Supreme Court review. See RoaZmsoN & KImKHAM, op. cit. supra note 39, § 325.
58 U.S. SuP. CT. R. 19.
59 102 So. 2d 599 (Fla.), rev'd per curiamn, 358 U.S. 66 (1958).
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under federal statute 60 a federal tax lien is superior to a mechanic's lien
arising under state law before the accruing of the tax. The Supreme Court
of Florida gave the mechanic's lien priority, and the Government argued
in its petition that this holding disregarded a series of Supreme Court
decisions. 61 In Rogers v. Calumet Nat'l Bank,6 2 a state court's power to
review the discretion of the Attorney General in vesting property under
the Trading With the Enemy Act 63 was questioned. The Appellate Court
of Indiana reviewed the action, thus conflicting in principle with a prior
Supreme Court ruling.64 In both these cases the Court granted certiorari
and reversed per curiam, by this means maintaining adherence to its
decisions.
But even a direct conflict with a Supreme Court decision does not
guarantee review. In Idaho Power Co. v. United States, 5 decision was
sought as to whether, upon a corporation's redemption of existing shares
of stock for both newly created shares of equal par value and cash, the
cash is to be considered a dividend. The Court of Claims said that it was
to be considered as part of the redemption rather than as a dividend en-
titling petitioner, a public utility, to an income tax deduction.6 6 The Gov-
ernment, also asking for grant of the petition, conceded the utility's alle-
gation of conflict with Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford.67 Particularly
in view of the Government's urgent request for clarification, 8 it would
appear that certiorari should have been granted. McKenna v. Seaton 
6 9
presented the issue of the prevalence of an application for a mineral land
lease-incomplete under the Secretary of the Interior's regulations-over
a subsequent but complete application. The District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed the Secretary's ruling that the omission was a curable defect
despite the noncompliance with the regulation and that there was no loss
of priority. Petitioner alleged conflict with Supreme Court decisions 70
to the effect that the Secretary is bound by his own regulations and has no
60 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3670, 3672.
61 E.g., United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957) ; United States v. Colotta,
350 U.S. 808 (1955).
62 128 Ind. App. 628, 149 N.E.2d 214 (1958), rev'd per curiain, 358 U.S. 331
(1959).
6340 Stat. 415, 416 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§5(b), 7(c) (1958).
64 Silesian-American Corp. v. Markham, 156 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1946), aff'd sub
nora. Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469 (1947).
65 142 Ct. Cl. 534, 161 F. Supp. 807, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958).
66 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 247, § 26(h), 53 Stat 18 (now INT. Rv. CODE OF
1954, § 247).
67 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
68 The Government stated that in another case it had urged a dividend result
relying upon the very argument petitioner raised in the instant case. The Govern-
ment's argument there also failed. Hawkinson v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 747 (2d
Cir. 1956). Cf. Stern, Denial of Certiorari Despite a Conflict, 66 HARv. L. REv. 465,
466 (1953).
69 259 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 835 (1958).
70 United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). See
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) ; Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Co., 338 U.S.
621 (1950).
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power to alter their requirements. These decisions appear consonant with
petitioner's position and, as noted by Judge Prettyman in dissent,7' the
case raises an important question of an administrator's adherence to his own
rules. However, the denial of review can perhaps be explained in that
the regulations then in force were amended before the Court ruled on
the petition.72
2. "Proximate" Conflicts
The great majority of conflicts alleged in other petitions do not sur-
vive critical examination; thus the certworthiness of the petition usually
must rest upon other grounds. However, some within this class approach
true conflict sufficiently to engender future litigation and this prospective
confusion justifies a more liberal interpretation of the direct conflict stand-
ard and often results in Supreme Court review. In Forman v. United
States,73 the Ninth Circuit reversed a conviction and ordered petitioner's
acquittal; on rehearing it modified the order and remanded for new trial.
Petitioner alleged double jeopardy under Sapir v. United States,74 but the
Ninth Circuit held that the acquittal order was not based on insufficiency
of evidence as was the case in Sapir.75 Although the Ninth Circuit's dis-
tinction appears to be fair, the Court evidently felt the issue so unclear
as to warrant clarification. 76 Other cases presenting "proximate" con-
flicts have not met with success as did Forman. In Cohen v. Public Hous-
ing Administration,77 petitioner alleged that federal-state public housing
was being allotted on a racially segregated basis. The Fifth Circuit's hold-
ing that petitioner had no standing because she failed to apply for occu-
pancy was alleged to be in conflict with one of its own cases and one
decided by the Fourth Circuit.78 The latter cases were distinguished by
the lower court on the ground that complainant there had made known his
pursuit of relief while in tlhe instant case the quest for relief was unarticu-
lated up to the time of suit. Furthermore, absence of formal application was
not a bar to standing in the Fourth Circuit because defendant had an
71259 F.2d at 784.
7243 C.F.R. § 200.5 (1954). The regulations now provide for an application
requiring less information and thus the pre-amendment incomplete application here
involved would now be sufficient.
73259 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.), modified on rehearing, 261 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1958),
rehearing denied, 264 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1959), aff'd, 361 U.S. 416 (1960).
74 348 U.S. 373 (1955).
75 The Ninth Circuit originally reversed with directions to enter judgment for
defendant in view of its holding that the case was submitted to the jury on an errone-
ous theory. 259 F.2d at 128. It modified this order inasmuch as the indictment was
sufficient to present an alternative theory. 264 F.2d at 956. See also Carbon Black
Export, Inc. v. The SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
76 It is to be noted that the Court's opinion gives no reason for the grant of
certiorari.
77257 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 928 (1959).
78 Gibson v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 246 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1957); School
Board v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
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announced policy of segregation, a fact not present in the instant case.
Although there was evidence in the instant case that defendant thought
segregation desirable, 79 the finding of no such announced policy lessens
the impact of the allegation of direct conflict. A. D. Julliard & Co. v.
Johnson 8 0 raised the issue of the allowability of an income tax deduction
for payments made to the Government in settlement of an alleged violation
of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.81 The Second Circuit denied
the deduction whereas the First Circuit in Commissioner v. Pacific Mills 
8 2
had allowed it under similar circumstances. Analysis reveals, however,
that in the instant case the alleged transgression was "willful," while in
Pacific Mills the alleged violation was due only to "negligence," and the
Supreme Court has recognized such a.distinction.
5 3
3. Intracircuit Conflicts
The Supreme Court's rules governing review plainly make no provi-
sion for resolving conflicts existing within the same circuit. Nevertheless,
the Court has in the past based grants of certiorari upon conflicting deci-
sions of different panels in the same court of appeals.8 4 In General Motors
Corp. v. United States,8 5 the Court of Claims apparently reversed itself for
the second time within four years on the question of whether that part
of the purchase price attributable to a warranty contract accompanying the
sale of consumer durable goods was subject to federal excise tax.8 6 Citing
previous Supreme Court decisions 87 as precedent, petitioner alleged an
"intracircuit conflict." Whatever may be the certworthiness of a true intra-
circuit conflict,8 8 there was no conflict in the Court of Claims: the instant
case dearly overruled the former decision. Other petitioners have at-
tempted to follow a similar route to review by alleging that there is con-
fusion in the circuit resulting from disagreement among circuit and district
79 257 F.2d at 75.
80259 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 942 (1959).
81 Ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
82207 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1953).
83 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) (dictum).
84 Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 508 (1950) : "Because
of this intracircuit conflict, we made a . . . grant of certiorari"; Maggio v. Zeitz,
333 U.S. 56 (1948) ; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bartels, 308 U.S. 180, 181
(1939): "Because of conflict in the rulings of the Court of Appeals of the Fifth
Circuit, due to the differing views of the judges composing the court . . and because
of the importance of the question, we granted certiorari . . . ." But see Harlan,
Some Aspects of the Judicial Process in the Supreme Court of the United States, 33
AusmL. L.J. 108 (1959): "[C]ontrary decisions between different components of
the same Court of Appeals . . . will not be considered to present a reviewable conflict,
since such differences of view are deemed an intramural matter to be resolved by the
Court of Appeals itself."
85 142 Ct. Cl. 842, 163 F. Supp. 854, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 866 (1958).
86 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 247, § 3443 (a) (2), 53 Stat. 417 (now INT. Rv.
CODE OF 1954, § 6611).
87 See cases cited note 84 supra.
88 See text accompanying note 84 stpra; ROBmTSON & KiKRHAm, op. cit. supra
note 39, at § 336.
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judges; 89 that there is current dispute among different panels within
the circuit; 90 and that there is conflict with an older case of the same
circuit.91
B. Important Federal Questions
The other significant basis for obtaining the Court's review is the
presentation of an important federal question.92 In this section the degrees
of importance of the myriad federal questions placed before the Court will
be examined.
1. Degree of Importance of the Question
Aside from those cases reviewed to resolve a direct conflict, virtually
all cases in which the Court grants certiorari contain a federal question
of exceptional importance to the public in the administration of the law.
To illustrate: Nelson v. County of Los Angeles,93 involving the due process
constitutionality of a county's discharge of public employees because of their
refusal on fifth amendment grounds to obey its order to answer congres-
sional committee questions relating to subversive activity, readily reveals
an issue of crucial importance in the area of civil liberties.94 Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux 95 raised a recurring and sig-
nificant question regarding the scope of federal jurisdiction: 9 6 the extent of
a federal district judge's power to abstain from interpreting a theretofore
uninterpreted state statute. In FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n,97 the issue
of the authority of the FTC to regulate interstate advertising of an insur-
ance company when the company's home state controlled both interstate
and intrastate deceptive trade practices posed a highly important problem
in the field of government regulation of business.
98
89 United States v. Chan Chick Shick, 254 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1958), aff'd sub noin.
Talc Shan Fong v. United States, 359 U.S. 102 (1959) (no reason given for the grant
of certiorari). Confusion was alleged to be manifested in the following cases: United
States v. Boubaris, 244 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Petition of Zaino, 131 F. Supp. 456
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Petition of Apollonio, 128 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
90 McKenna v. Seaton, 259 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 835
(1958), alleged to be in conflict with Barash v. Seaton, No. 14069, D.C. Cir., April 25,
1958; Seaton v. Texas Co., Nos. 13636, 13637, D.C. Cir., May 8, 1958; McKay v.
Wahlenmaier, 226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
91Trihey v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 838 (1958), alleged to be in conflict with Des Marais v. Beckman, 198 F.2d
550 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 922 (1953).
92 See text accompanying note 5 supra.
93362 U.S. 1 (1960).
94 See also, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Kingsley Int'l
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
95 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
96 See also, e.g., McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
97 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
9s See also, e.g., FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959); SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
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However, there are cases of seemingly exceptional importance with
which the Court chooses not to deal. In Lodge 12, District 37, Intl Ass'n
of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc.,99 the issue was whether a
federal district court had jurisdiction to determine if certain action was
equivalent to an unfair labor practice, which finding was requisite in
deciding whether there was a breach of a collective bargaining agreement
to arbitrate. This question, never decided by the Supreme Court,100
appears to be one of some consequence in the allocation of jurisdiction
between the courts and the NLRB. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
Collector 'll presented the question of whether the imposition of an appor-
tioned state income tax on a foreign corporation whose only nexus with the
state was the presence of manufacturers' representatives was consonant with
the commerce and due process clauses of the federal constitution. Because
the Court's recent pronouncement ' 0 2 on what constitutes a sufficient nexus
involved foreign corporations having substantially more contact1o3 with
the taxing state and because that decision provoked considerable uncer-
tainty, 1 4 review would appear to have been desirable. In Underwood v.
Maloney,0 5 the issue was whether or not the class suit device of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 could be utilized to obtain diversity jurisdiction
over an unincorporated association ' 0 where applicable state law '07 pro-
hibited class suits against such associations. The commentators have
indicated the moment of the controversy and have criticized the lower court
decision.'0 8 In Brewster v. United States,0 9 the Court was urged to decide
if Congress had authorized the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on In-
vestigations of the Committee on Government Operations to investigate
labor unions. Although it is arguable that Congress would be particularly
inclined to correct the lack of authorization found by the District of
Columbia Circuit, the Government's position that clarification is needed on
99 257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
100 Id. at 472. See also 107 U. PA. L. REv. 876 (1959).
101234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 28
(1959).
102 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
103 In Northwestern States, the corporation had both an office and salesmen who
actively solicited orders within the taxing state. Neither fact appeared in Brozwn-
Forman. In addition, 48% of the cement company's sales were made in the taxing
jurisdiction.
104 See CCH STATE TAX CAs. REP. 111 3-001 to -080.
105 256 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958).
106 The citizenship of an unincorporated association for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction is that of all the members and not of the entity. Thomas v. Board of
Trustees, 195 U.S. 207 (1904). See 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 17.25, at 1412-13
(2d ed. 1948).
107 FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b) provides that capacity to be sued in the federal courts
is to be determined ordinarily by the law of the state in which the district court sits.
108 107 U. PA. L. REv. 559 (1959); Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1182 (1959).
109 255 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 842 (1958) (Reed, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, retired, dissenting in the court of appeals).
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the degree of specificity required of Congress in extending authorization
to this subcommittee" 0 and to committees in general seems tenable.
Although at one time "almost half of the granted petitions . . .
concerned taxation," I" this number has currently diminished to less than
ten per cent. And among the denials are to be found several cases of
apparent significance. The issue in Commissioner v. American Gilsonite
Co." 2 was whether costs incurred in the bagging and transportation to
point of shipment of petitioner's mineral product were "ordinary treatment
processes" so as to be included in gross income for the purpose of com-
puting depletion allowance." 3 This general problem has been most per-
plexing to the lower federal courts 114 and its importance is further evi-
denced by a recent Supreme Court grant of certiorari'- 15 at the urgent
behest of the Government 116 in a similar case. Ford Motor Co. v. United
States 1.7 raised a substantive issue-whether the sale of a warranty con-
tract was subject to federal excise tax-identical to that in General Motors
Corp. v. United States."8 In view of the manifest vacillation by the Court
of Claims 119 on this question and the widespread business use of warranty
contracts, the failure of the Supreme Court to grant certiorari is difficult
to explain.
Perhaps the harshest criticism of the Court's exercise of discretionary
jurisdiction in the past was directed at the failure to grant certiorari in
the civil liberties area.120 Without attempting generally to evaluate the
validity of such a criticism 121 in this Term or any other, examination of
the 1958 docket uncovers certain cases in this field which might reason-
ably have been reviewed. In Garland v. Torre,122 a newspaper reporter
110 See United States v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1956) ; United States v.
Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D. Mass. 1956) ; United States v. O'Connor, 135 F. Supp.
590 (D.D.C. 1955), rev'd per curiam, 240 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
111 Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1929, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1, 15 (1930).
112 259 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 925 (1959).
11 3 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 247, § 114(b) (4) (B), 53 Stat. 45, as amended, ch.
521, §319, 65 Stat 497 (1951) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §613(a)).
114 See cases cited 108 U. PA. L. Rxv. 758, 760 n.11 (1960).
115 United States v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co., 268 F.2d 334 (7th Cir.), cert.
granted, 361 U.S. 923 (1959) (No. 513).
1 6 See 108 U. PA. L. REv. 758, 763 n.29 (1960).
117 140 Ct Cl. 487, 156 F. Supp. 554 (1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958).
118 142 Ct. Cl. 842, 163 F. Supp. 854, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 866 (1958), discussed
in text accompanying notes 85 and 86 supra.
119 Ibid. The Ford case apparently overturned General Motors Corp. v. United
States, 147 F. Supp. 739 (Ct. Cl. 1957), which itself appeared to overturn General
Motors Corp. v. United States, 128 Ct Cl. 465, 121 F. Supp. 932 (1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 942 (1955).
120 See, e.g., Harper & Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the
1949 Term-An Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 293, 303-11 (1950);
Harper & Etherington, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1950 Term,
100 U. PA. L. REv. 354, 367-92 (1951).
121 "Regardless of what standard for review may be formulated, no one dissatis-
fied with a decision below, be he litigant, lawyer, or law professor, ever applauds a
denial of certiorari." Weiner, The Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 HARV. L. Rev.
20, 63 (1954).
122 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). Mr. Justice
Douglas was of the opinion that certiorari should have been granted.
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challenged, as contrary to the first amendment, a federal contempt convic-
tion arising from refusal to divulge the identity of her source of informa-
tion. In Miranda v. Commission of Investigation and two related cases,
1 23
the New York Commission of Investigation, specifically charged by its
authorizing statute to "cooperate with departments and officers of the
United States government in the investigation of violations of the federal
laws 1. . 24 refused to accept petitioner's plea of fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination despite the fact that federal agents
were present and that petitioner was under investigation by a federal grand
jury. The question of the availability of the privilege in a state proceeding
when there is a showing of collaboration between state and federal offi-
cers has been specifically left open by the Court.1 25  And the recent per
curiam opinion in Mills v. Louisiana 126 sheds no light on the problem.
It would seem that Miranda, denied review by the Court twenty-one days
after the Mills decision 127 and presenting an excellent case for a finding
of collaboration, afforded the Court an opportunity for clarification.
One may fairly distinguish the cases examined in the preceding para-
graphs from the larger number of cases which, although presenting ques-
tions of apparent significance and therefore properly reviewable by the
Court, cannot be said to have been improperly denied. In SEC v. Insur-
ance Sec., Inc., 28 a stockholder-director sold control of an investment
advisor company at a price in excess of net asset value. The issue was
whether he could be enjoined under the Investment Company Act of
1940 129 from subsequently acting as a director of such a company on the
theory that his prior conduct constituted gross misconduct or gross abuse
of trust. The Ninth Circuit's holding of no abuse has been sharply criti-
cized. 130 The Court's denial can perhaps be explained by the relative
infrequency of the specific occurrence and by the factual determinations
necessarily inherent in the resolution of this issue. In Flying Tiger Line,
Inc. v. County of Los Angeles,131 determination was sought regarding the
extent to which a domiciliary county could impose an ad valorem property
tax on aircraft engaged in interstate and foreign commerce. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court applied a percentage-of-time-in-the-state formula.
The general principles of state power to tax migratory assets have been
123 Riccobono v. Commission of Investigation, and Castellano v. Commission of
Investigation, all reported in 5 N.Y.2d 1026, 158 N.E.2d 250, 185 N.Y.S.2d 550, cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 930 (1959).
124 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 989, § 2, para. 5.
125 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
126360 U.S. 230 (1959).
127Mills was decided June 8, 1959; certiorari was denied in Miranda together
with Riccobono and Castellano on June 29, 1959.
128254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
129 54 Stat. 841, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1958).
130 72 -A1V. L. REv. 1176 (1959) ; 68 YALE L.J. 113 (1958). It is to be noted
also that the SEC was the petitioning party here. See note 401 infra and accompanying
text
13151 Cal. 2d 314, 333 P.2d 323, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1001 (1959).
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enunciated by the Court,13 2 but no suggestions as to formulas have been
forthcoming.133 Helpful as such a statement by the Court would be in
settling an extensively litigated state court question, the Court's time may
be more profitably spent. It was asserted in Bercut-Vandervoort & Co. v.
United States 134 that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's 135
ban on discrimination against imported products was violated by effectively
taxing petitioner's imported gin on a wine-gallon basis while taxing do-
mestic gin on a proof-gallon basis.136 Although the result of the case
affects many similarly situated importers,137 the Court's decision to allo-
cate its time elsewhere is not open to serious question. In four cases
before the Court, 138 the issue was whether state statutes 139-regulating
minimum motor carrier rates so as to preclude lower rates for which the
United States negotiated-were contrary to the supremacy clause of the
Constitution. The Court had recently held invalid a California statute
which did not absolutely preclude the lower rates but which required special
application to the state commission. 140 Petitioner maintained that the
ground of decision in that case was that the required procedures, not the
preclusion of lower rates, were the unconstitutional element. Although
this argument has been given some credence, 141 the Court evidently felt
its prior decision sufficiently clear. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v.
United Truck Lines, Inc.142 posed the question of the right of a common
carrier holding an ICC certificate of public convenience and necessity to
maintain an action for damages for infringement of his territory by a non-
132 E.g., Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization & Assess-
ment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954); Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
133 See the concurring opinion in the Flying Tiger case, 51 Cal. 2d at 323, 333
P.2d at 328.
134 Customs Appeal No. 4937, C.C.P.A., Nov. 14, 1958; the opinion of the Customs
Court may be found in 151 F. Supp. 942 (1957).
135 61 Stat. (Part V) A18, as amended, 62 Stat. 3679 (1948).
136The tax on domestic gin is imposed at the time of withdrawal from bond
(at that time being over 100 proof) and based on proof gallonage. The tax on
petitioner's gin is imposed at the time of import (at that time being already bottled
and 100 proof or under) and based on wine gallonage. The effect of this is to include
in petitioner's tax base the diluting products used in the bottling operation while not
including the dilutions in the tax base of the domestic producers.
137 151 F. Supp. at 953 (dissenting opinion).
138 Kentucky v. United States and Hughes Transp., Inc. v. United States, 128
Ct. Cl. 221, 168 F. Supp. 219 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 968 (1959); Union
Transfer Co. v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 217 (Ct Cl. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
968 (1959); United States v. Pennsylvania Public Util. Comm'n, 393 Pa. 537, 143
A.2d 341, cert. denied, 358 U.S, 884 (1958).
139 Ky. Rwv. STAT. §§ 281.590, .685 (1959); NEn. REV. STAT. §§ 75-222, -224
(Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, §§ 1142-43 (1959).
140 Public Util. Comn'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
141 "We think the plaintiffs' argument is a legitimate one, in view of some of
the language in the Supreme Court's opinion, but, reading the opinion as a whole, we
think the California decision governs the instant case . . . ." 168 F. Supp. at 218.
See also Note, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HAuv. L. REv. 77, 162-64 (1958).
142 330 P.2d 522 (Ore. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1001 (1959).
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certificated carrier.143 The Supreme Court of Oregon held, not without
uncertainty,'4 that the Interstate Commerce Commission had exclusive
power to punish. Perhaps the Supreme Court felt its prior pronounce-
ments had adequately delineated this general area.145 Socarras v. United
States 146 presented the issue of whether Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 21(b) permits a criminal defendant to move for transfer of trial in
the transferee rather than the transferor court. Because, as the Govern-
ment pointed out, much of the apparent hardship resulting from the Fifth
Circuit's denial of the motion could be mitigated by the allowance of such
a motion in absentia in the transferor court, review by the Supreme Court
does not seem essential.
The civil liberties area also produced several cases falling into this
category. In Blum v. Texas,147 state authorities withheld statements made
by prosecution witnesses from petitioner; he argued that such action con-
stituted a denial of fourteenth amendment due process. Although Jencks
v. United States 148 concerned the "procedures for the administration of
justice in the federal courts," 149 it is not wholly untenable to argue that the
above circumstances are a denial of fair trial. But since there was dispute in
the Texas courts as to the existence of prejudice, perhaps the issue is not
best presented by the instant case. One issue in MacKenna v. Ellis 150 was
whether or not a state court's imposition of counsel on a criminal defendant
against his wishes constituted a denial of fair trial under the fourteenth
amendment. The Fifth Circuit held that petitioner was entitled to a
hearing on his writ of habeas corpus to determine the truth of his alle-
gations. This question has not been decided by the Supreme Court; 151
but inasmuch as a new trial may be granted solely on the ground of an-
other issue 152 also remanded for hearing and inasmuch as it may be deter-
mined at the hearing that in fact there was no imposition of counsel, it
would appear that the case is not now ripe for review. In De Bernardo v.
Rogers,153 a deportation proceeding in which an indigent defendant was
denied the right to counsel was attacked as a denial of fifth amendment
143 The noncertificated carrier had been enjoined by the ICC from operating over
the petitioner's route. United Truck Lines v. ICC, 189 F.2d 816 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951).
144 "Under the circumstances it is not unreasonable to assume that it was the
intent of Congress to place in the Interstate Commerce Commission the exclusive
power to determine whether particular violations of the Act should result in punish-
ment." 330 P.2d at 528. See also 68 HARv. L. Rv. 1272 (1955).
145 E.g., T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959).
146 No. 17252, 5th Cir., May 27, 1958, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 826 (1958).
147 317 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 952 (1959).
148 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
149 Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 345 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
150 263 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 935 (1959).
151 But cf. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942).
152 The petitioner had alleged that he was denied reasonable opportunity to
secure the presence and testimony of his witnesses, and the court of appeals deter-
mined that he was entitled to a hearing on this also.
53 254 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
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due process. Although the issue is undecided by the Court, several points
justify the denial of certiorari: there was some question as to whether
petitioner had waived counsel, 154 and there was no issue of fact or law
decided at the hearing which was not subsequently decided when petitioner
was represented by counsel. 155 Review was sought in Fouts v. United
States 56 as to whether petitioner by failure to demand trial at any time
had waived his right to speedy trial under the sixth amendment when trial
was held ten years after indictment.157 Although the handicap in defend-
ing ten years after the transaction is apparent, perhaps the Government's
averment that such lengthy delayi are contrary to its present policy reveals
the Court's position in denying certiorari.15 8 Finally, in Eaton v. Board
of Managers, 59 petitioner, a Negro physician, alleged a fourteenth amend-
ment denial of equal protection by the refusal of a North Carolina hospi-
tal to grant him courtesy staff privileges. The facts alleged to constitute
state action-the sole issue-were, inter alia: the hospital's use of eminent
domain; the land for the hospital had been originally deeded by the city
and county so long as it be used for their benefit and they held a possi-
bility of reverter in case of disuse or abandonment; prior annual subsidies
by the city and county and present per diem payments by them for the
care of indigent patients; and prior operation by municipal authority.1 0
Even though these facts appear to be stronger than those of Girard College
Trusteeship,'6' it may be that the Court is seeking a more generic situa-
tion before passing judgment on this significant issue.
Another category of federal-question cases presents problems which,
though interesting and novel, are comparatively insignificant in that a
Supreme Court decision would have relatively little value except to the
154The hearing had been originally recessed so petitioner could obtain counsel.
When the hearing was reconvened petitioner did no more than merely state that he
was indigent. The hearing then proceeded. 254 F.2d at 82.
155 Petitioner was subject to deportation because of two prior convictions for
crimes involving moral turpitude. See 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1958).
Petitioner admitted the convictions at the deportation hearing and was found de-
portable. The dispositive issue, whether the crimes of which petitioner had been
convicted involved moral turpitude, was relitigated in petitioner's subsequent suit for
declaratory judgment in which he was represented by counsel. 254 F.2d at 82.
156 258 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 884 (1958). Chief Justice
Warren, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Whittaker were of the opinion that
certiorari should have been granted.
157 Petitioner was federally indicted after being convicted in a state court and
sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Upon release after serving the state sentence
he was convicted under the original federal indictment.
158 But see Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 533 (1960) (separate opinion
by Mr. Justice Brennan).
'59 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959). Chief Justice
Warren, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Brennan were of the opinion that
certiorari should have been granted.
160 "In 1881, when the hospital was established, and thereafter during the period
ending in 1901, when it was supported and operated by municipal authority, it might
well have been described as a State agency even though the funds for its operation
had been illegally appropriated by the municipalities." 261 F.2d at 525.
161 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958) (the second
Girard College case).
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actual litigants. Many such cases reach the Court's docket. Representa-
tive is United States v. Winters,162 in which the Tenth Circuit held that
an Oklahoma petitioner's otherwise deductible business expense for gifts
of whiskey to clients was nondeductible because an Oklahoma statute 163
forbade making gifts of whiskey. Since only Oklahoma and Mississippi -'4
had such statutes, 165 the issue of whether disallowance of the deduction
is necessary to implement state policy appears too limited to justify Su-
preme Court review. The petitioner in Earle v. United States166 chal-
lenged the Second Circuit's holding that she had forfeited her alien depar-
ture bond 167 -despite her timely departure-by obtaining employment in
violation of her alien status. The Government gained the proceeds as
liquidated damages without showing specific injury. 68 Although the issue
seems interesting enough, research indicates no other cases having ever
arisen on the point. In Holeman v. Louisville & N.R.R., 6 9 petitioner,
possessing a railroad pass with a waiver of liability but having made addi-
tional payment for a parlor seat, was denied recovery for injuries sus-
tained when the train was derailed. The Supreme Court has in the past 17 0
upheld the waiver where the passage was wholly gratuitous. The Holeman
case afforded the Court an opportunity to limit this criticized '71 decision
but it would appear that the infrequency of the distinguishing fact here
present calls for Court denial of review. In Walkden v. United States 7 2
estate tax was paid under an invalid will; the beneficiary under the valid.
will (a charitable organization-thus exempting the estate from the tax)
sought recovery of the amount paid. The Sixth Circuit having held the
refund barred by the statute of limitations, 7 3 petitioner argued that this
was not a suit for refund but for the return of money paid due to mutual
mistake. The issue of statutory interpretation is engaging but apparently
of no widespread significance.
In Grady v. Irvine 7 4 the question was whether the fact that the
Virginia wrongful death statute 175 creates a new right of action rather
162 261 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 943 (1959).
163 Okla. Laws 1933, ch. 153, § 2.
164 Miss. CODE ANN. § 2613 (1957).
165 Government's Brief in Opposition, p. 5.
166 254 F.2d 384 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 822 (1958).
167 The conditions of the bond were that the alien comply with the conditions of
admission and depart on the proper date. 254 F.2d at 386 nl1.
168 The court found "indirect damage done to the national economy, the expense
of investigation and the maintenance of an agency to enforce the provision of the
Immigration Laws." 254 F.2d at 387.
169 319 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1012 (1959).
170 Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445 (1948).
'71 See, e.g., 96 U. PA. L. REv. 902 (1948) ; 9 U. PIr. L. Rv. 304 (1948) ; 34
NA. L. REv. 604 (1948).
172 255 F.2d 681 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958).
173 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 247, § 910, 53 Stat. 138 (now INT. REV. ConE OF
1954, § 6511(a)).
174 254 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 819 (1958).
175 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-628.1, -633, -634, -640 (Supp. 1957).
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than cause of action 176 calls for a redetermination of diversity jurisdiction
when the administrator is substituted as plaintiff. The Supreme Court
has held'L77 that substitution of a nondiverse administrator in a stock-
holder's derivative suit does not necessitate redetermination, but this was
distinguished by the Fourth Circuit by means of its interpretation of the
Virginia act.'78  Inasmuch as interpretation of the Virginia statute has
been peculiar, 179 Supreme Court review does not seem essential. In Bar-
nard-Curtiss Co. v. United States,180 a subcontractor sought to recover
under the Miller Act181 on a performance bond filed by a contractor for
the protection of the United States. The losing party in the district court
filed an appeal to the Tenth Circuit thirty-one days after judgment. Peti-
tioner argued that the thirty-day period of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
73(a) should govern rather than the sixty-day provision for cases in
which the United States is a party. Although the precise issue in the
instant case has never been resolved by the Supreme Court, an earlier
decision 182 involving similar circumstances under a predecessor of the
Miller Act held that the United States is a real litigant for purposes of
jurisdictional amount. The implications of that case and the restricted
impact of the question presented indicate the propriety of the Court's
decision not to review.
2. Correctness of the Decision Below as a Possible
Factor Regarding Importance
The Court has unequivocally stated that a denial of certiorari is of
no precedential value regarding the merits of a case.18 3  However, this is
not to say that the apparent correctness of the decision below may not, in
some cases, become a factor in the Court's decision to deny review.'8 4
Thus the failure to accept cases presenting important questions undecided
176 Anderson v. Hygeia Hotel Co., 92 Va. 687, 24 S.E. 269 (1896).
177 Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957).
178 See 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAC7iCE 25.02, .05 (2d ed. 1953).
179 254 F.2d at 227.
180 252 F.2d 94 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 906 (1958).
18149 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-d (1958).
182 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 349 (1907).
183 See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Powe, 283 U.S. 401, 403-04 (1931);
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950) (opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari). Nonetheless,
legal commentators, Harper & Leibowitz, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do
During the 1952 Term, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 427, 438, 440 n.60 (1954) ; the courts, e.g.,
United States v. Camara, 271 F.2d 787, 789 (7th Cir. 1959); MacInnis v. United
States, 191 F.2d 157, 161 n.3 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1952);
Nelson v. Commissioner, 104 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1939) ; Berger v. United States, 170
F. Supp. 795, 796-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; Ross v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 371, 246 S.W.2d
884, rehearing denied, 157 Tex. Crim. 375, 246 S.W.2d 886, cert. denied, 343 U.S.
969 (1952) ; and the general public, Harper & Etherington, What the Supreme Court
Did Not Do During the 1950 Term, 100 U. PA. L. Rxv. 354, 355 & n.6 (1951), have
indicated the belief that the denial of certiorari does have some precedential value.
184 "But if the cases are viewed as a whole, it would seem that, since the grants
of certiorari came most often in cases where the Court disapproved of the decisions
1960]
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by the Supreme Court is possibly explained by the indisputable correct-
ness of the lower court opinion. Such a case was Rushlight v. United
States,'85 in which the petitioner, who had been contracting with the Gov-
ernment for four years, attempted to set off losses incurred in two of those
years against excess profits in the other years for the purpose of reducing
his liability to the Government under the Renegotiation Act.' 86  The Ninth
Circuit's decision that the act makes no provision for setoff appears emi-
nently accurate. In Bennett v. The Mormnacteal,87 a longshoreman, in-
jured on his employer's ship, sought to avoid the exclusive remedy against
his employer provided by the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act ' 8 8 by libelling the ship in rem. Despite petitioner's argu-
ment that the ship was a juridical third party, 8 9 it is clear that the suit
was directed against the employer-shipowner, thus falling under the statute.
In Petition of Terzich,190 petitioner's ability to attack collaterally a final
order of deportation in a naturalization hearing was in issue. The Third
Circuit's decision that this is clearly precluded by the statute 191 and its
Congressional history appears unassailable. 92  Bedno v. Fast19 3 raised
the question of whether the Federal Trade Commission Act 194 precluded
a state from regulating truthful price advertising of eyeglasses. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court's holding that the act applied only to false adver-
tising is, in the statute's own terms, patently correct. In Noe v. FCC,195
it was contended that Loyola University's connection with the Society of
Jesus made it a "representative of [an] alien" under the Communications
Act of 1934 196 so as to preclude the school from obtaining a television
license. The District of Columbia Circuit's finding that the connection
was too attenuated 197 to fall within the statutory purpose is 'not open to
below, the denial of certiorari may imply at least some degree of approval of the
decision below." Harper & Pratt, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the
1951 Term, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 439, 446 (1953). Examination of Supreme Court
statistics for the last ten years reveals that of all cases in which certiorari was granted,
about two-thirds were reversed.
185 259 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 952 (1959).
18656 Stat. 245 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1191 (1958).
187254 F.2d 138 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 817 (1958).
18844 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §905 (1958).
189 The exclusiveness of the act applies only to the employee-employer relationship.
Ibid.
190256 F.2d 197 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 843 (1958).
-19166 Stat. 243 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (1958).
192 Petitioner may seek judicial review of the deportation order by habeas corpus,
declaratory judgment, or injunctive relief under § 10(b) of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 60 Stat 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(b) (1958). 256 F.2d at 199, 200.
193 6 Wis. 2d 471, 95 N.W.2d 396, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 931 (1959).
194 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1958).
195 260 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 924 (1959).
19648 Stat. 1086, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §310(a) (1958).
197 "But the record shows that this hierarchical chain of authority . . . has
never been used in the past to impinge upon the independence of the University in the
operation of its radio station. Under all the circumstances, even if Section 310(a)
be thought to have a semblance of relevance to the present case, it nevertheless would
be inapplicable since it was incorporated in the Communications Act to 'guard against
alien control and not the mere possibility of alien control.' S. REP. No. 781, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934)." 260 F.2d at 741-42.
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question. And, although the general issue of what constitutes an "alien"
under this statute has not been passed upon by the Court, the facts of this
case do not lend themselves to fruitful delineation of the scope of the
statutory prohibition. Finally, the Court, in Alaska Airline, Inc. v.
CAB,198 was asked to determine if the Civil Aeronautics Act 199 authorized
the CAB to promulgate regulations concerning depreciation of air carriers.
The District of Columbia Circuit's conclusion, after exhaustive review
of the legislative history, that no such authority exists appears unobjec-
tionable.200
III. THE PETITIONS
It has been said many times that the great majority of petitions filed
are totally frivolous and that their draftsmen are totally inept.20 1  It is
here proposed to examine the quality of the lawyers' work with regard to
the petitions for certiorari.
A. Ineffectual Attempts To Obtain Review
1. False Conflicts
A number of petitions alleged a conflict with a case that had been
decided many years before. Needless to say, if the older conflicting case
is an undisputed Supreme Court decision of long standing the age of the
case adds force to the precedent.20 2  But in the large majority of these
cases, the petitioner appears to be doing no more than making a token
attempt to comply with the Rules, and the Court has regarded him in like
198257 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 881 (1958).
199 Ch. 601, §487(d), 52 Stat. 1000 (1938).
2 0 0 The court found that grants of such authority to other federal agencies have
been expressly provided for by statute. Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 854 (1935),
16 U.S.C. §825a(a) (1958); Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 826 (1938), 15 U.S.C.
§ 717h(a) (1958); Motor Carrier Act, 49 Stat. 563 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 320(c) (1958); Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat 916, 944 (1940), as amended,
49 U.S.C. § 20(4) (railroads), § 913 (water carriers) (1958); Communications Act
of 1934, 48 Stat 1078, 47 U.S.C. §220(b) (1958). The fact that the Board may
indirectly regulate depreciation through its authority to fix a carrier's rates adds
weight to the court's finding.
201 E.g., Ulman & Spears, Disnissed For Want of a Substantial Federal Question,
20 B.U.L. Rsv. 501 (1940). "This steady broadening of the Supreme Court's juris-
diction upon certiorari and the marked increase in the number of petitions filed have
been accompanied, however, by no corresponding gain in understanding at the bar
concerning the nature and function of the writ." Frankfurter & Hart, The Business
of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1933, 48 HARv. L. Rzv. 238, 262 (1934).
202In State ex rel. Klapp v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 263 F.2d 909 (6th Cir.),
rev'd per curiam, 359 U.S. 552 (1959), a resident of Ohio sued another resident of
Ohio and joined the defendant's mortgagee, a resident of New York whose interest
was identical to that of the defendant's. The mortgagee removed to a district court
and the requisite jurisdiction was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. Since plaintiff and
one of the defendants were residents of the same state the case was clearly in con-
flict, as alleged by petitioner, with The Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457 (1879).
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fashion.20 3 In City of Tallahassee v. Olin Mills, Inc.,20 4 the question con-
cerned the validity of imposing a state license tax on transient drummers
engaged in interstate commerce where the sales contracts were consum-
mated outside the state. The Supreme Court of Florida held the tax an
undue burden on interstate commerce. Petitioner alleged a conflict with
a Fourth Circuit decision; 20 5 however, since the time of that decision the
Supreme Court had clearly settled the issue contrary to the prior hold-
ing.20 6  In Byrne v. Matczak 207 the issue was whether the separation of
the jury after a civil case had been committed to it was ground for re-
versal despite no showing of prejudice. Conflict was alleged with an 1808
federal case 2 0 8 which held that separation in itself would cause the verdict
to be set aside. However, as the brief in opposition pointed out, modem
authority is to the contrary.20 9 Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. North 210 was a
diversity case in which the issue was common-law fraud. Petitioner al-
leged that the Fourth Circuit decision conflicted with numerous pre-Erie
cases dating back to 1806.211
It is undeniable that many cases are worthy of Court review solely
because they involve a fact situation, the impact or implication of which
has never before been assessed within the framework of a governing legal
principle. Thus, certiorari was granted in Ingram v. United States2 1 2 to
determine as to both entrepreneurs of the gambling enterprise and their
employees the quantum of evidence necessary to support a conviction of
conspiracy to evade federal lottery taxes.213  On the other hand, where
controlling legal principles have been given substance through application
to a number of fact situations so that the effect of certain facts upon the
rule of law may be reasonably predicted, an allegation of conflict is not
justified if the presence or absence of such significant facts may reasonably
203 "Especially is the Court wary of spurious conflicts, loose allegations of con-
flict, conflicts depending upon the petitioning counsel's peculiar view of the facts.
Multiplication of asserted conflicts is not only ineffective, but may be damaging; ten
or twenty distinguishable cases have been known to bury one which is indistinguish-
able." Frankfurter & Hart, supra note 201, at 269 n.75. But the Court has granted
certiorari in the past for a "seeming conflict," Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388,
389 (1947), and even for an "alleged conflict," Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence
Warehouse Co., 336 U.S. 631, 633 (1949).
204 100 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 924 (1959).
205 Lucas v. City of Charlotte, 86 F.2d 394 (4th Cir. 1936).
206 Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
207 254 F.2d 525 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
208 Lester v. Stanley, 15 Fed. Cas. 396 (No. 8277) (C.C.D. Conn. 1808).
209 See cases cited in the Third Circuit opinion, 254 F.2d at 528-29.
210 255 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 874 (1958).
211 E.g., Tasigi v. Brown, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 182 (1854); Russell v. Clarke's
Executors, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 69 (1812); McFerran v. Taylor, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
270 (1806). Another example of a pre-Erie conflict is Kagan v. Moody, 309 S.W.2d
515 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958), involving a question
of state property law, and alleged to be in conflict with Love v. Simms's Lessee, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat) 515 (1824).
212 360 U.S. 672 (1959).
213 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4401, 4411, 7201. The conspiracy statute may be
found in 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1958).
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distinguish the cases and thereby produce the opposite result. Nonethe-
less, many such conflict allegations, reconcilable because of differing facts,
are found in the petitions. In Owensboro on the Air, Inc. v. United
States,2 14 the issue was whether or not petitioner had received adequate
notice of the contemplated deletion of a television channel where notice of
proposed rulemaking made no mention of it but where petitioner became
aware of the proposed action during the course of the proceeding. The
District of Columbia Circuit found sufficient notice, and conflict was al-
leged with a Ninth Circuit decision 215 which refused to sustain a conviction
for violation of a regulation despite actual notice of the regulation. The
significant distinguishing fact in the latter case was that the regulation had
not been published in the Federal Register as specifically required by the
Administrative Procedure Act.216 In United States v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc.,217 the dispute concerned the correctness of an accrual basis taxpayer
accruing as income in the year of allowance mail transportation pay which
was not actually received until a subsequent year. The Fifth Circuit's
denial of the accrual was alleged to be in conflict with the Supreme
Court 218 and two other circuits.2 19  But in the instant case the amount
involved was not ascertainable with reasonable accuracy in the year of
allowance. Other instances of such conflict allegations involved the fol-
lowing issues: the quantum of evidence of negligence sufficient to take a
case to the jury; 2 0 the quantum of evidence of fraudulent concealment
sufficient to take a case to the jury; 221 what constitutes adequate notice
under the Miller Act; 22 2 the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a finding
of highest and best use of property in a condemnation proceeding; -2 2 3 the
reasonableness of a municipal zoning classification of property as residen-
214262 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959).
215 Hotch v. United States, 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954).
21660 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §1002(a)(3) (1958).
217 255 F.2d 501 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 882 (1958).
218 Continental Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States, 286 U.S. 290 (1932).
219 Schaeffer v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1958) ; Baird v. Commis-
sioner, 256 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1958), aff'd sub nor. Commissioner v. Hansen, 360
U.S. 446 (1959).
220 E.g., Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 1013 (1959), alleged to be in conflict with Lee v. Pennsylvania RR., 192 F.2d
226 (2d Cir. 1951).
221 Crunmer Co. v. Du Pont, 255 F.2d 425 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
884 (1958), alleged to be in conflict with Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax
Consol., 185 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951).
222 49 Stat. 794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270b(a) (1958), United States ex rel. Hopper
Bros. Quarries v. Peerless Cas. Co., 255 F.2d 137 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
831 (1958), alleged to be in conflict with Bowden v. United States ex rel. Malloy,
239 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. (1957).
223 United States v. Jones Beach State Parkway Authority, 255 F.2d 329 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958), alleged to be in conflict with United States
v. Des Moines County, 148 F.2d 448 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 743 (1945);
Jefferson County v. TVA, 146 F.2d 564 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945) ;
United States v. Two Acres of Land, 144 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. granted,
324 U.S. 833, dinissed on motion of petitioner, 324 U.S. 884 (1945).
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tial; 224 whether, under California law, a soldier traveling in his own auto-
mobile to a newly assigned station was within the scope of his employ-
ment; 225 whether employees who sell food to interstate carriers are engaged
in interstate commerce for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act; 226
whether, in assessing the validity of a patent, the criteria of "invention"
have been met; 227 whether, in a condemnation proceeding, the exclusion
of evidence of subsequent sales of other property was prejudicial;
228
and whether a registrant was prejudiced by failure of a local selective service
board to post the names of advisors in the board's office as required by
then-existing regulations.
229
A discouraging number of petitions alleged conflicts which any rea-
sonable examination would prove to be patently frivolous. In Odd Fel-
lows Oakridge Cemetery Ass'n v. Oakridge Cemetery Corp.,
230 appellant
unsuccessfully sought to enjoin a municipality from erecting a pumphouse
upon a cemetery corner lot which had been conveyed to it by the cemetery
for that purpose. On appeal to the Supreme Court, conflict was alleged
with Supreme Court opinions 23 1 involving the abridgement of religious
freedom. At issue in UMW v. Meadow Creek Coal Co. 23
2 was a labor
union's responsibility in tort for members' actions. Petitioner asserted
that the Sixth Circuit's finding of union liability conflicted with a Supreme
Court decision.23 3  Reference to that decision readily reveals the Court's
express disavowal of consideration of the union responsibility issue.
234
224E.g., McMahon v. City of Dubuque, 255 F.2d 154 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 833 (1958), alleged to be in conflict with Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183 (1928).
225 Chapin v. United States, 258 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
924 (1959), alleged to be in conflict with Hinson v. United States, 257 F.2d 178
(5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Mraz, 255 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1958).
22652 Stat. 1067 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (2) (1958), Mitchell
v. Sherry Corine Corp., 264 F.2d 831 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 934 (1959),
alleged to be in conflict with McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U;S. 491 (1943).
227 E.g., Zoomar, Inc. v. Paillard Prods., Inc., 258 F.2d 527 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 908 (1958), alleged to be in conflict with Otto v. Koppers Co., 246
F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 939 (1958) ; Plax Corp. v. Precision
Extruders, Inc., 239 F.2d 792 (3d Cir. 1957).
228 United States v. Meadow Brook Club, 259 F.Zd 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 921 (1958), alleged to be in conflict with United States v. 63.04 Acres of
Land, 245 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), on remand, 154 F. Supp. 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd,
257 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1958).
229 Wolfe v. United States, 256 F.2d 434 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 819
(1958), alleged to be in conflict with Steele v. United States, 240 F.2d 142 (1st Cir.
1956).
2z0 14 Ill. App. 2d 378, 144 N.E.2d 853 (1957), appeal disnissed, 358 U.S. 36
(1958).
2 3 1 Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) ; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathe-
dral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
232263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959).
233 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
234 "The only issue in this case relates to the nature and scope of the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. We are not concerned here with a complete
delineation of the legal status of unincorporated labor unions. We express no opinion
• . . as to the necessity of considering them as separate entities apart from their
members for purposes other than the one posed by the narrow issue in this case."
Id. at 697.
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In Evans v. Buchanan 235 the Third Circuit ordered the Delaware State
Board of Education to adopt a plan for desegregating schools. Petitioner
contended that, according to Delaware law, local school boards must be
a party to these decisions and alleged conflict with a decision of the Dela-
ware Supreme Court.23 6 However, it was there clearly held that, although
the state board's rules called for joint action with local boards, Delaware law
vested ultimate power in the state board. Petitioner argued in White v.
United States 237 that the opening of a fourth class air mail parcel by
federal agents without a warrant was an illegal search and seizure and
alleged that the Ninth Circuit's denial of this claim conflicted with an
Eighth Circuit decision.23 8  However, the earlier case definitely stated
that the prohibition extended only to first class mail and thus, whatever
the substance of petitioner's claim, no conflict existed. The question in a
Ninth Circuit case 2 3 9 was whether, conceding that the exclusion of certain
evidence was error, petitioner had waived the objection. Petitioner's
alleged conflict was with a Supreme Court case 240 that concerned the evi-
dentiary point but did not consider waiver. An issue for decision in Dorn
v. Balfour, Guthrie & Co.24" dealt with the liability of a ship's port agent,
whose only relationship to the vessel on which petitioner was injured was
in making contractual arrangements for its benefit when requested to do
so by the master. The Ninth Circuit having held no duty, petitioner
asserted that the Supreme Court had reached the opposite result.242 How-
ever, that case spent fifty-five pages of the United States Reports discuss-
ing a jurisdictional issue and, in one sentence, affirmed the district court's
dismissal of a claim against a port agent.
2. Manufactured Federal Claims
It has been observed that "every case is important to the individual
litigant who has lost below, so that his counsel is in duty bound to at-
tempt, in as lawyerlike fashion as possible, to fit the questions presented
by that case into certiorari categories." 243 Yet every duty has its limit,
and the zeal of some lawyers-far in excess of whatever the duty may be-
results in a glaring abuse of the Court's rules. Thus, where petitioner's
recovery under an airline insurance policy depended upon whether his
trip was "scheduled," 244 petitioner alleged that a federal question was
presented because some federal statute talks in terms of scheduled trips.
235 256 F.2d 688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 836 (1958).
236 Steiner v. Simmons, 111 A.2d 574 (Del. 1955).
237254 F.2d 137 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958).
238 Oliver v. United States, 239 F.2d 818 (8th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed,
353 U.S. 952 (1957).
239 Ruud v. United States, 256 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 817
(1958).
240 MCCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342 (1936).
241262 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959).
242 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
243 Wiener, The Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 HARv. L. REv. 20, 64 (1954).
244 Thompson v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 16 Ill. App. 2d 159, 148 N.E.2d 9, cert.
denied, 358 U. S. 837 (1958).
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But the Illinois Appellate Court had simply construed the insurance con-
tract, never mentioning any federal statute. In a diversity case involving
the accuracy of a trustee's accounts in which a "net worth method" test
was applied,2 45 petitioner argued that an important, undecided federal
question was presented inasmuch as, while the Court has reviewed the
validity of this test for federal income tax purposes, it has never considered
it in a trustee's accounting context. In a diversity negligence and breach
of warranty action against an airplane manufacturer,246 petitioner asserted
that CAB approval of the aircraft as being safe must have influenced the
finding in the manufacturer's favor; thus a federal question was presented.
However, the only place where mention of CAB approval may be found
is in the petition for certiorari itself. A Tennessee statute 247 authorizing
the reimbursement of utilities forced to relocate because of interstate high-
way construction was held invalid under the state constitution,248 and
petitioner alleged a substantial federal question because the federal high-
way program was instrumental in passage of the state statute. And
finally, in a diversity suit for fraud, 9 petitioner represented the case as
raising a federal question by citing pre-Erie Supreme Court decisions in
fraud cases.
250
Scrutiny of the petitions reveals that some litigants go beyond an
argumentative statement of the facts and refashion them so as to lend
weight to the substantive claim presented. Thus, in Spano v. New
York,251 petitioner alleged that he was beaten by the police, a fact not
appearing at any stage of the litigation, including the subsequent Supreme
Court opinion finding coercion. 25 2  In United States v. Thompson,25 3
petitioner argued that the burden of proof employed in his criminal prose-
cution for contempt was "preponderance of the evidence" rather than
"beyond a reasonable doubt"; but the district court opinion 254 makes
clear that such was not the case. Thompson further asserted that he
was subjected to double jeopardy because the trial judge considered his
original conviction in sentencing him for contempt; this was expressly
245 Bird v. Stein, 258 F.2d 168, 180-81 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
926 (1959).
246 Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 910 (1958).
247 Tenn. Acts 1957, ch. 170.
248 State v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 319 S.W2d 90 (Tenn. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 1011 (1959).
249 Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. North, 255 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 874 (1958). See prior discussion in text accompanying notes 210-11 supra.
250 See cases cited note 211 supra.
251 360 U.S. 315 (1959), reversing 4 N.Y.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226, 173 N.Y.S.2d
793 (1958).
252 It may also be noted that one of the crucial facts relied upon by the Supreme
Court in finding coercion-the sympathy falsely aroused by a policeman who was a
childhood friend of the petitioner and who told petitioner his job was in jeopardy
if petitioner didn't confess-appeared in neither the petition for certiorari nor the
state court decision.
253 261 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 967 (1959).
254 117 F. Supp. 685, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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disavowed by the trial judge. One of petitioner's major contentions in a
case coming from Oregon 255 was that the state supreme court sua sponte
amended the indictment and affirmed petitioner's conviction on a point
never in issue at the trial; a reading of the opinion lends no support to
this assertion. In Holeman v. Louisville & N.R.R.,256 petitioner con-
tended that the expense of the trip in issue would have been reimbursable
by the railroad if the petitioner did not have a pass; but the Kentucky
court's opinion 25 7 clearly states that it was a pleasure trip to visit peti-
tioner's daughter. Although the Court will re-examine certain ultimate
facts found by lower courts if a federal right hinges on such a finding,
258
it is manifest that the situations discussed above do not fit within this
category.
3. Confusion Between Federal and State Rights
As one would expect, some petitioners are unaware of the fact that
judicially created federal rules of court are inapplicable to state practice. 25 9
For example, in a state bribery conviction, 260 petitioner urged the Court
to find entrapment as a matter of law, citing Sherman v. United States.261
But that case specifically mentioned that the defense was available in the
federal courts. 26 2  Two state cases 26 3 involved delays in arraignment and
petitioners urged violation of the rules of the McNabb 24 and Mallory 26 5
cases-both specifically limited to the federal courts 2 66 and to Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 5 (a).267
Several petitioners asserted the infringement of a state statute as a
ground for Supreme Court review, including: an Oklahoma statute 2
68
255 State v. Langley, 214 Ore. 445, 323 P.2d 301 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
826 (1958).
256319 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1012 (1959). See prior
discussion of this case in text accompanying notes 169-71 supra.
257 319 S.W.2d at 47.
288 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380
(1927).
259 This was especially true of petitioners on the miscellaneous docket and others
who appeared pro se.
200 State v. Moore, 168 Ohio St. 270, 153 N.E.2d 675 (1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 944 (1959).
261356 U.S. 369 (1958).
262 1d. at 372.
263 People v. Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 326 P.2d 457, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 866 (1958);
People v. Teitelbaum, 163 Cal. App. 2d 184, 329 P.2d 157 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958),
appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 206 (1959).
264 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
2e5 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
266 318 U.S. at 345.
267 354 U.S. at 453.
268 Oyu.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 854 (1958).
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regarding the admonition of juries before a recess; 269 an Ohio statute 
270
allegedly giving an appeal by right in criminal cases to the Ohio Supreme
Court; 271 a Kentucky statute 272 concerning oaths of election officials; 273
a Kentucky statute 274 giving the city legislative body final authority to
determine what public improvements shall be made.2 75  Clearly, violation
of a state statute alone presents no federal question.
4. Petitions Primarily of Factual Significance
There are a large number of petitions which set forth controversies,
in areas governed by developed legal principles, that are decided on the
basis of the presence or absence of a particular fact or facts. It has been
previously noted 2 76 that certain factual situations in still-developing areas
of the law are certworthy. But those in which a decision would provide
guidance to no one other than the litigants directly involved should never
reach the Supreme Court docket. However, such cases persist: the issue
of whether petitioner contributed to respondent's delay in bringing a copy-
right infringement suit so as to bar his defense of laches was presented
2 77
as was the question of whether certain advances made by petitioner to a
closely held corporation constituted capital contributions or loans.278 Also
brought before the Court was the correctness of both courts below in
holding that the record supported the finding that an insured obtained
reinstatement of a National Service Life Insurance policy by fraud.
279
The nature of certain payments by a corporation to the widow of an em-
ployee-taxable income or gift 2 8Q-was likewise raised.28 '
269 Crabtree v. Oklahoma, 359 U.S. 990 (1959) (denying certiorari to the Crimi-
nal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, unreported).
270 Appellant alleged violation of Ouio REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.04 (Page 1954);
this section, however, is not in point. Section 2953.02 (Anderson Supp. 1959) pro-
vides for an appeal by right for cases involving constitutional claims. Appellant
appeared pro se.
271 Dye v. Ohio, 358 U.S. 45 (1958) (dismissing appeal and denying certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Ohio, unreported).
272 Ky. REv. STAT. § 116.120 (1959).
273 Hodges v. Hodges, 314 S.W.2d 208 (Ky.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 894 (1958).
This case alleged violation of several Kentucky statutes.
274 Ky. REV. STAT. § 94.292(3) (1959).
275 City of Druid Hills v. Broadway Baptist Church, 316 S.W.2d 698 (Ky.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 910 (1959).
276 See text accompanying and following notes 212-13 mipra.
277 Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Charles K. Harris Music Publishing Co.,
255 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 831 (1958).
278 Gilbert v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002
(1959). Losses resulting from a capital contribution are deductible to a limited
extent only, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 247, § 117(d) (1), 52 Stat. 502 (now INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1211), whereas losses resulting from the noncollectibility of a
business loan are fully deductible. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 247, § 23(k) (1), 52
Stat 462 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166). The Supreme Court has articulated
the general standard governing this problem in John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner,326 U.S. 521, 530 (1946).
279 Kiefer v. United States, 255 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 828
(1958).280 The Supreme Court has articulated a general standard in Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
281 Simpson v. United States, 261 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
944 (1959).
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In State v. Kilgore,2 82 petitioner, while visiting in South Carolina
and intending to remain five days more, went into North Carolina, bought
whiskey and re-entered with his purchase without paying the South Caro-
lina tax; petitioner contended that he was moving in interstate commerce
and therefore immune from the tax; the state court held that he had come
to rest; this factual determination is governed by a long standing Supreme
Court doctrine.283  Similarly, in Gough Indus., Inc. v. State Bd. of
Equalization,2 4 the issue was whether a "continuous journey" was inter-
rupted when goods for export were delivered to a packer before shipment
abroad, title passing to the buyer on delivery of goods to the packer. This
factual determination is also governed by well-settled rule.28 5 In National
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Republic of China,28 6 petitioner sought resolution
of whether loss of insured vessels occasioned by the masters' and the
crews' defection to the Communist Chinese in contravention of the owner's
order was caused by "barratry"-within marine and war risk insurance
coverage-or by "seizure," which is excepted from coverage; the general
maritime definitions have been articulated with precision many times.
287
5. Totally Frivolous Petitions
All that may be said concerning a substantial number of contentions
found in the petitions is that they are completely frivolous. One peti-
tioner, indicted on a gambling charge,288 alleged a denial of fair trial
because some jury members had at one time placed a wager; 289 another 290
alleged that the imposition of the personal holding company surtax 29 1 on
a corporation deriving its income solely from patent royalties was repug-
nant to the Constitution inasmuch as congressional creation of the patent
was constitutionally authorized.292 The contentions were made: that a life
sentence imposed by a state court for a murder conviction was unreason-
able;293 that a state statute 29 4 requiring naturopaths to obtain a medical
282233 S.C. 6, 103 S.E.2d 321, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 826 (1958).
283 Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
284 51 Cal. 2d 746, 336 P.2d 161, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1011 (1959).
285 See Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 (1929).
280 254 F.2d 177 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
287 E.g., Patapsco Ins. Co. v. Coulter, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 222 (1830); Greene v.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 217 (1864) ; Earle v. Rowcroft, 8 East
126, 103 Eng. Rep. 292 (K.B. 1806).
288 INT. Rrv. CODE oF 1954, § 4411.
289 Gaston v. United States, 358 U.S. 898 (1958) (denying certiorari to District
of Columbia Circuit, unreported). This despite the fact that the trial judge ques-
tioned the prospective jurors regarding "sour experiences" with gamblers.
290 O'Connor v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 910 (1959).
291 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 247, § 502(a), 53 Stat. 105 (now INT. RaV. CODE
oF 1954, § 543(a) (1)).
292 Petitioner appeared pro se.
293 evard v. State, 332 P.2d 967 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 1000 (1959).
294 Mo. Rav. STAT. §§ 334.010, .030 (Supp. 1952).
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license violated fourteenth amendment due process because, inter alia,
this construction of the statute was part of a plot against naturopaths by
medical doctors; 295 that fair trial was denied in a state prosecution in
which the prosecuting attorney appeared as a witness against petitioner
to identify him, for purposes of the state multiple offender statute,296 as
a man formerly prosecuted; 297 that, in a condemnation proceeding, the
United States Attorney improperly associated with the jury members
because he accompanied them on a bus trip to the viewing of the property
while petitioner's counsel did not; 299 that, because petitioner might copy-
right his petition and because the parties to Societe Internationale v.
Rogers 299 had not presented material facts concerning the litigation, peti-
tioner had a right to intervene therein.300
Further illustrations: in Daviditis v. National Bank,30 1 the lower
courts for the third time 302 found no federal jurisdiction in petitioner's
nondiversity action to set aside an alleged common-law fraudulent con-
veyance; petitioner here attempted to found jurisdiction on seven different
federal statutes.30 3 Petitioner alleged in Acme Specialties Corp. v. Bibb 804
that an Illinois statute 305 prohibiting sale and use of sparklers violated
due process inasmuch as prior statutes had for twenty-two years ex-
empted sparklers. Two petitions 306 made the contention that the ma-
jority opinion of the FCC in the present case was assailable because
one commission member had formerly misinterpreted the statute now in
issue.3 7 And it was argued 301 that the court erred in holding a rea-
295 State ex rel. Collet v. Errington, 317 S.W.2d 326 (Mo. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 992 (1959).
2
9 6 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.09 (1944).
297 Shargaa v. State, 102 So. 2d 809 (Fla.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958).
298 Webb v. United States, 256 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
931 (1959). Petitioner appeared pro se.
299 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
300 Leighton v. Rogers, 359 U.S. 935 (1959) (denying certiorari to the District
of Columbia Circuit, unreported). Petitioner appeared pro se. The Government said:
"The petitioner is a complete stranger without any economic stake in the outcome
of the litigation and without any status in the case." Brief in Opposition, p. 4.
301262 F.2d 884 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1012 (1959).
3 02 Daviditis v. National Bank, 251 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1958) ; Davis v. Foreman,
239 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1956).
303 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 493, 1005 (1958) ; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1339, 1348, 1349 (1958).
Petitioner appeared pro se.
804 13 Ill. 2d 516, 150 N.E.2d 132, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958).
3 05 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 276.27-.31 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959).
306 Springfield Television Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 259 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 930 (1959); Winnebago Television Corp. v. United
States, 258 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 930 (1959).
307 It is true that former Commissioner Doerfer had erred in the interpretation of
48 Stat. 1083 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §307(b) (1958). Television Allocations,
22 F.C.C. 365, 376, 378-79 (1957) (dissent). But he did not do so in the instant case.
809 American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Taussig, 255 F.2d 765 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 883 (1958).
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sonable time for collateral attack on a judgment3 ° 9 had elapsed when
petitioner, after failing to appeal from the original judgment, sought to
attack collaterally ten years later.
B. Mechanics
1. Jurisdictional Defects
There is a group of petitions-some presenting questions suitable for
Supreme Court review-which suffer from the infirmity of failure to
satisfy a jurisdictional prerequisite. Among the recurrent defects are
untimely filing, failure properly to raise the issue below, that the judgment
below is not final or that it rests on adequate nonfederal grounds, and
that the question presented is moot.
Untimely Filing
The times allotted for filing petitions for certiorari are clearly set
forth in the rules of the Court.3 10 Where the ninety'day requirement
was applicable, petitions for certiorari were found filed 95,311 100,312 and
108 313 days after final judgment of the court below. In the last case
petitioner sought to justify the delay by arguing that the petition was filed
within ninety days after notification 3 1 4 of the Seventh Circuit judgment.
But the authority cited concerned a peculiarity of the Second Circuit and
was therefore inapposite.315 Examination of petitions in those cases gov-
erned by the thirty-day rule revealed filings 35,316 44,317 and 62 318 days
after final judgment of the court below. One of these petitioners attempted
to explain his waiting forty-four days to file by contending that the time
for filing dates not from the day of the judgment of the court of appeals
but from the day that the judgment was returned to the district court.
Rule 22(2) 319 is clearly contrary.
3 0 9 FFR. P- Crv. P. 60(b)(4).
310 U.S. Sup. CT. R. 22 (certiorari), 11 (appeal).
311 Spaeth v. United States, 254 F.2d 924 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 831
(1958).
312 Cuba R.R. v. United States, 254 F.2d 280 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
840 (1958).
313 Armour & Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 254 F2d 719 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958).
314 That is, when the mandate was physically returned.
315 Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
316 Walters v. United States, 256 F.2d 840 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 833
(1958).
317 United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880
(1958).
313 Murrell v. United States, 253 F.2d 267 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 841
(1958).
319 "A petition for writ of certiorari to review the judgment of a court of appeals
in a criminal case shall be deemed in time when it and the certified record required
by Rule 21 are filed with the clerk within thirty days after the entry of such judgment."
U.S. Sup. CT. R. 22(2). (Emphasis added.)
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Although the Court has on occasion stated that certiorari was denied
because of late filing,3 20 in none of the above cases did the Court choose
to ascribe a reason. Objections that have been advanced against the
Court's explaining denial of review in every case include it would require
additional time in an already crowded schedule, and different members of
the Court may have different reasons for voting to deny.321 However, it
would appear that these reasons are inapplicable when the denial is prem-
ised upon a tardy filing.
322
Failure To Raise Properly Below
Both statute and Court rule require that in cases coming from state
courts the federal question be properly raised by the litigants and passed
upon by the court. In several state cases in which review was sought,
this defect was observed. 23  For example, having obtained a Iexican
divorce and discontinued support payments, the petitioner later obtained
a Nevada divorce. After the second divorce order, petitioner's wife in
Douglas v. Douglas 32 4 sued for and recovered support payments found to
be owing until the time of the Nevada decree. The petition for certiorari
asserted that the decision in the wife's favor violated the Status of Aliens
Treaty. 25  Inasmuch as this contention-the only one presented-was
raised for the first time in the petition, it would have seemed proper for
the Court to have stated this defect as the reason for its denial. In Mc-
320 Delphi Frosted Foods Corp. v. Illinois Cent. Ri.R., 342 U.S. 833, denying
certiorari to 188 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1951) ; Hope Basket Co. v. Product Advancement
Corp., 342 U.S. 833, denying certiorari to 187 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1951).
321 Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917-18 (1950) (opinion
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari).
For criticism of this position see Harper & Pratt, What the Supreme Court Did Not
Do During the 1951 Term, 101 U. PA. L. Rxv. 439, 440-46 (1953).
322 In contrast to the certiorari cases mentioned, it is interesting to note that in
Territo v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 855 (D.N.J. 1958), appeal dismissed, 358 U.S.
279 (1959), an appeal from a three-judge district court was taken 132 days after
entry of judgment. Even though the statute, 28 U.S.C. §2101(b) (1958), clearly
provides a maximum sixty-day limitation, no mention of late filing was found in the
preliminary papers. The Court dismissed "for the reason that the notice . . . was
not filed within the time provided by law." 358 U.S. at 279.
323 An excellent example of this defect was noted in a case on appeal: in City
of Miami v. Ganger, 101 So. 2d 116, 123 (Fla. 1958), appeal disnissed, 359 U.S. 64
(1959), appellant challenged the validity of assessment against his property for street
improvement. The Supreme Court of Florida held that appellant had received adequate
notice by publication and was now estopped from challenging; appellant, relying on
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), urged in his
jurisdictional statement that the notice was inadequate since no necessity was shown
by the state for dispensing with actual notice. The Court postponed jurisdiction to
a hearing on the merits, 358 U.S. 804 (1958), and subsequently "dismissed for want
of a properly presented substantial federal question." 359 U.S. 64 (1958). Both the
state court opinion and the preliminary papers were unclear as to whether the issue
of "necessity" had been properly presented; evidently argument revealed that it had
not. Therefore, an issue of apparent significance was foreclosed from review.
324 164 Cal. App. 2d 230, 330 P.2d 659 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 990 (1959).
325 46 Stat. 2753 (1930).
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Dermott v. Jamula, 26 petitioner argued, inter alia, that the state court's
failure to reinstate him in his union despite his late payment of dues
violated fourteenth amendment equal protection. As the brief in opposi-
tion pointed out, this issue had not been raised below. In Sarner v. Sar-
ner,327 an argument advanced by appellant was that the state court violated
a federal right by not properly notifying him that the contempt proceeding
was criminal. The motion to dismiss correctly indicated appellant's failure
to articulate this theory previously. The petitioner in New Jersey v.
Dancyger 328 alleged that the prosecutor's comment to the jury concerning
petitioner's failure to testify violated due process. Here, too, the ques-
tion was not argued before the state court. McDermott, Sarner and Dan-
cyger, all of which presented several issues considered by the state court
in addition to the allegations initially raised in the petition, are illustrative
of the difficulties allegedly inherent 329 in the Court's stating the reason
for each denial. Finally, in Loeb v. Loeb,330 petitioner contended that the
forum state's refusal to entertain an action for alimony based upon a valid
foreign ex parte divorce violated the privileges and immunities clause of
the federal constitution. This point was raised for the first time in an
unsuccessful petition to the New York Court of Appeals 331 for reargu-
ment; thus it was not reviewable according to the settled policy of the
Court.
3 32
The express requirement that the question be properly raised below
and passed upon by the court does not exist in cases originating in federal
courts, "although only in exceptional circumstances will . . . [the
Court] consider questions not presented." 3 33 Thus, in St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Chicago Union Station Co.,33 4 which concerned a rail-
road station company's liability for loss of baggage, petitioner first argued
the significance of the Interstate Commerce Act 335 in his certiorari petition.
In De Pova v. Camden Forge Co.,336 a diversity case, the petition for
certiorari introduced the issue of forum non conveniens. It is manifest
that neither case meets the "exceptional circumstance" 337 requisite.
326154 N.E.2d 595 (Mass. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 968 (1959).
327 28 N.J. 519, 147 A.2d 244, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 533 (1959).
32829 N.J. 76, 148 A.2d 155, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 903 (1959).
329 See note 321 supra and accompanying text.
3304 N.Y.2d 542, 152 N.E.2d 36, 176 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
913 (1959).
331 5 N.Y.2d 793, 154 N.E.2d 574, 180 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1958).
332 Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1944).
3 3 3 RoDERTsoN & KIREHAld, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES § 61, at 109 & n.1 (2d ed. Wolfson & Kurland 1951).
334 253 F.2d 441 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830 (1958).
33534 Stat. 593 (1906), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1958).
336 254 F.2d 248 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
337 See text accompanying note 333 supra.
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Want of A Final Judgment
A federal statute 338 requires that all cases coming from state courts
be final judgments. As has been done on occasion in the past,
3 39 lack of
final judgment was given as the express reason for denying certiorari in
NAACP v. Williams.8 40  In this case petitioner was cited for contempt
on failure to produce certain records. Among petitioner's arguments
were the following: that the $25,000 fine paid into the court constituted
cruel and unusual punishment; that the citation of contempt following the
order to produce by only a few hours constituted a denial of due process.
The latter argument appears significant,3 41 but inasmuch as the fine may
be reduced when compliance is had, the judgment was not final. In Wright
v. Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry.,3 4 petitioner's jury verdict in an
FELA case was reversed and the case was remanded for new trial by the
Ohio court. It being manifest that there had been no ultimate decision
in the case,3 43 the Court could justifiably have assigned this as reason for
denial. And, in Anonymous (No. 1) v. Hart,3 44 petitioner's motion to
quash a subpoena was transferred to another term of the Supreme Court
of New York. The motion had neither been heard nor decided; there was,
therefore, no final judgment. The Court stated no reason for the denial of
certiorari.
Whether or not the state court decision represents a final judgment
is in itself a federal question.3 45  And many respondents argue, in oppo-
sition to the petition, that the Court should find nonfinality. Thus in
Burns v. Ohio,3 46 the Clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court notified petitioner
that his in forma pauperis appeal must be accompanied by a docket fee.
Contrary to the state's main argument opposing certiorari, the Court held,
two Justices dissenting, that the clerk's letter to petitioner was the court's
"final judgment."
Generally,3 47 in cases coming from the federal courts, the statutes 848
allow review of both final and interlocutory judgments, but it has been
observed that only "extraordinary cases" 349 of the latter kind will be ex-
amined. An interesting situation is found in Rogers v. Schering Corp.: 350
338 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958).
339E.g., Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 342 U.S. 877 (1951);
Garcia v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 329 U.S. 741 (1946).
340 359 U.S. 550 (1959).
341 See 359 U.S. at 551 (separate opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas).
342 107 Ohio App. 310, 152 N.E.2d 421 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 979 (1959).
343 See Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62 (1948).
344 359 U.S. 953 (1959) (denying certiorari, unreported below).
345 Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264 (1942).
346360 U.S. 252 (1959).
34 7 For comprehensive outline of this area and the exceptions, see ROBERTSON &
KIRKIHAM, op. cit. supra note 333, §§ 125, 130.
348 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252-54 (1958).
349 ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 333, § 130.
350 262 F.2d 180 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 991 (1959).
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after the district court vacated an arbitration award on the ground that
an arbitrator was without qualification,351 respondent appealed to the Third
Circuit; petitioner's motion to dismiss the appeal because of the nonfinality
of the district court's order was denied. When petitioner sought certiorari,
respondent argued that the order below-the denial of the motion to dis-
miss the appeal-was nonfinal. Since the interlocutory order of the Third
Circuit appears to be in conformity with existing law 352 and since the
forthcoming Third Circuit decision on the merits may render petitioner's
objection moot, this case could not be classified as an "extraordinary" 353
one. In England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,354 the
Fifth Circuit remanded for hearing after holding that the district court
erred in dimissing-for want of a substantial federal question-respond-
ent's claim that the state's Medical Practice Act355 as applied to chiro-
practors was contrary to the fourteenth amendment. That the question
is not now ripe for review is apparent. In Haltom City State Bank v. Sea-
board Surety Co.,356 the United States was sued in the Court of Claims
and impleaded petitioner as a third-party defendant. Petitioner's motion
to dismiss-on the ground that United States recovery against him in the
Court of Claims would violate his right to jury trial-was denied. Since
the merits have yet to be resolved against the United States,357 the Court
of Claims' order is clearly interlocutory, and, although the jury trial issue
appears as an important federal question, there seems to be no overriding
necessity for the Court to entertain the case at this time. Finally, in
Preformed Line Prods. Co. v. Watson,3 58 the District of Columbia Circuit
held that the district court's finding of nonpatentability should be vacated
because the issue was not properly before the court; however, the order
was conditioned on petitioner's application to the district court for a new
trial on the issue of patentability. The petition for certiorari urged that
the vacating should have been unconditional. The possibility of the dis-
trict court finding for petitioner on remand renders Supreme Court con-
sideration at this time unnecessary, even if the issue of patentability were
otherwise proper for Court review.
Adequate Nonfederal Ground
A long-standing principle of the Supreme Court is that it will not
review cases coming from state courts which are based on independent,
351 165 F. Supp. 295 (D.N.J. 1958).
352 Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers, 353 U.S. 550 (1957).
353 See note 349 supra and accompanying text.
354 259 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1958), rehearing denied, 263 F.2d 661 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1012 (1959).
355 LA. REv. STAT. §§ 37:1261, :1271(4), :1286 (1950).
356 359 U.S. 1001 (1959) (denying certiorari to the Court of Claims, unreported).
357 The third-party complaint against petitioner cannot prevail if the United
States wins.
358 257 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 945 (1959).
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adequate, nonfederal grounds.8 59  In two cases 360 the Court of Appeals
of Maryland held that a Maryland retroactive tax amendment was repug-
nant to due process under both the federal and state constitutions. Re-
spondent's brief in opposition was based solely on the argument of ade-
quate nonfederal grounds. Since the Maryland court intermingled the
issues sufficiently to cause some confusion 361 as to whether there was an
adequate state ground and since the issue presented appears to be of limited
importance,3 62 the Court could properly refrain from stating the jurisdic-
tional defect as the reason for denial-a practice having some precedent.
36 3
In Miller v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 364 petitioner,
alleging that inadequate notice had denied him due process, sought man-
damus to review the revocation of his liquor license. The California
court held only that mandamus did not lie because of petitioner's failure
to exhaust administrative remedies, 365 an adequate state ground. Like-
wise, in State ex rel. Iaus v. Carlton,66 appellant, asserting that a mu-
nicipal zoning ordinance was unconstitutional, sought mandamus for the
issuance of a construction permit. The decision of the Supreme Court
of Ohio was limited to holding that mandamus was unavailable because
appellant did not exhaust his administrative remedies,3 67 an adequate state
ground. The Court's failure to articulate this reason for denial in Miller
and Carlton can be explained only by the possibility that the Court also
believed the claims on the merits to be without importance or substance.
868
A somewhat different aspect of the same jurisdictional defect is pre-
sented when a state court finds that a claimant has ignored reasonable
state procedures in presenting his federal question. 69 Thus, in People v.
Wein,3 7 0 the California Supreme Court denied petitioner's request to aug-
ment the record on appeal in order to prove that he had not been promptly
859 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
360 Comptroller of the Treasury v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 216 Md. 259, 140 A.2d 301,
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 822 (1958) ; Comptroller of the Treasury v. Glenn L. Martin
Co., 216 Md. 235, 140 A.2d 288, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 820 (1958).
361 Cf. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
362 The case turns on the validity of a Maryland statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 81
(1957), as amended by Md. Laws 1957, ch. 3, which retroactively applied a sales
and use tax for a period of ten years.
363 Cf. Rice v. Arnold, 342 U.S. 946 (1952); McKay v. Foster, 332 U.S. 783
(1947).
364 160 Cal. App. 2d 658, 325 P.2d 601 (Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
907 (1958).
365 This is the rule in California. Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.
2d 280, 109 P.2d 942 (1941).
366 168 Ohio St. 279, 154 N.E.2d 150 (1958), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 359
U.S. 312 (1959).
367 This is the rule in Ohio. State ex rel. Lieux v. Village of Westlake, 154
Ohio St. 412, 96 N.E.2d 414 (1951).
368 See note 321 supra and accompanying text.
869 Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935) ; cf. Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S.
226 (1904).
370 50 Cal. 2d 383, 326 P.2d 457, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 866 (1958), 359 U.S. 942,
992 (1959).
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arraigned; petitioner alleged the tardy arraignment as a violation of
constitutional rights. But the state court's denial was based solely on the
California rule that such a claim cannot be initially raised on appeal.
371
And in Friedman v. Hill8 7 2 petitioner's assertion that there was insuf-
ficient evidence of his employee's interstate activity to sustain the em-
ployee's action under the Fair Labor Standards Act 373 was rejected by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court on the sufficient state ground that peti-
tioner's failure to move for a directed verdict at the trial precluded review
of the argument.3 74
The importance of the jurisdictional prerequisite is recognized in the
many briefs in opposition which allege the existence of an independent,
nonfederal ground for the state court's decision. However, a consider-
able number of these allegations are without merit. In Medberry v. Pat-
terson,375 petitioner sought state habeas corpus, contending that his con-
viction of twenty years ago was constitutionally invalid because, then
indigent, he was denied counsel and transcript on appeal. The Colorado
Supreme Court affirmed the denial without opinion. Opposing certiorari,
the state urged that the absence of an opinion in itself raised the possi-
bility that the state court decision rested on an adequate state ground.376
The respondent's sole contention in Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County of
Los Angeles 377 was that the California Supreme Court held only that the
case should be remanded to a state agency to determine whether any other
state had acquired the power to tax petitioner's aircraft. But, in fact,
that court held specifically that the county could not assess the tax upon
the full value of the property. Finally, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson,378 respondents alleged that the Alabama Supreme Court's re-
affirmance on remand from the Supreme Court of petitioner's contempt
conviction was based on acts of noncompliance other than that which the
Court had previously declared to be constitutionally protected. It was
true that there was a clearly nonfederal ground for the Alabama decision,
but the Court held that the Alabama court was precluded from resting
the decision upon it.
3 79
371 People v. Newell, 192 Cal. 659, 221 Pac. 622 (1923).
372 325 P.2d 434 (Okla.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958).
37352 Stat. 1069 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1958).
374 This is the rule in Oklahoma. Richardson v. Shaw, 313 P.2d 520 (Okla. 1957).
375 358 U.S. 932 (1959) (denying certiorari to the Supreme Court of Colorado,
unreported).
376 Had the state indicated some nonfederal ground upon which the judgment
could have been based, the argument would not be untenable. See generally ROBERT-
SON & KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 333, § 91.
377 51 Cal. 2d 314, 333 P2d 323 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1001 (1959). See
prior discussion of this case in text accompanying notes 131-33 supra.
378 360 U.S. 240, reversing 268 Ala. 531, 109 So. 2d 138 (1959).
379 In the prior disposition of the case, the parties were in agreement, and the
case was argued and decided upon the basis that only that part of the order which
required production of the membership lists had been violated. 360 U.S. at 243.
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Mootness
The Constitution prohibits the Supreme Court from deciding moot
issues: they present no case or controversy.8 0 Thus, in NAACP v. Com-
mittee On Offenses Against the Administration of Justice,381 petitioner
alleged that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' failure to quash a
subpoena of a legislative committee which demanded production of the
names of NAACP members violated its constitutionally protected rights.
Respondent argued that inasmuch as the committee had been dissolved
before the petition and there was no indication that the names will be
otherwise sought, the case had become moot. The Court so held.
2. Draftsmanship
The Supreme Court Rules state that "review on writ of certiorari
. will be granted only where there are special and important reasons
therefor." 382 Many petitioners instruct the Court concerning the sig-
nificance of their case; many more do not. Particularly in those cases
in which certiorari is granted is a good showing of importance made.
Thus, in a case involving the question of whether a civilian employee of
the military may be tried for a noncapital offense by an overseas court-
martial,383 petitioner pointed out that the issue affects all civilian personnel
of the armed forces overseas. In Service Storage & Transfer Co. v. Vir-
ginia,384 the Court was asked to determine if motor transportation between
two points in the same state-but traversing another state en route-was
interstate in nature; petitioner indicated that a great number of truckers
were engaged in such carriage. Virtually every other petition granted
contained some attempt to conform to the admonishment of the rule, and
in the remaining few the importance was usually manifest.
Petitioners not infrequently amass figures-"either the number of
cases litigated or likely to be litigated on the issue, or the number of
people affected by the decision" 3 85 --to emphasize the significance of their
cases. The Government, probably having some advantage in the com-
pilation and availability of pertinent statistics, rarely overlooks an oppor-
tunity to use them in demonstration of significance or insignificance before
the Court. Thus, the Government has stated that the determination of a
particular issue will affect 27,000 persons; 33 6 that the United States is
380U.S. CONST. art. III, §2; see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227
(1937).
381 358 U.S. 40, vacating 199 Va. 665, 101 S.E.2d 631 (1958).
382U.S. Sup. CT. R. 19(1).
383 McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960), reversing
United States ex reL. Bohlender v. Wilson, 167 F. Supp. 791 (1958).
384359 U.S. 171 (1959), reversing 199 Va. 797, 102 S.E.2d 339 (1958).
385 Harper & Leibowitz, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1952
Term, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 427, 449 (1954). For the Court's recognition of this factor
see Alcoa S.S. Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 421, 423 (1949); Ludecke v. Watkins,
335 U.S. 160, 162 n.2 (1948).
3s Wiggins v. United States, 261 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 942 (1959).
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making a claim similar to that in the instant case in forty pending cases; 8s7
that millions of dollars of strike benefits are being paid which will not be
included as taxable income; 3 88 that 3,800 cases involving ten million dol-
lars are affected by the issue; 389 that the ICC reports that thousands of
railroad runs similar to the one in issue are made each day; 390 that there
are 20,000 civilian overseas employees that may be affected.391 A limited
number of other petitioners also present statistics. Their papers have
pointed out that the decision will have impact upon 22,000 businesses
holding government contracts and three million employees will be
affected; 392 that there are fourteen cases pending on the validity of the
statute under attack; 3 9 3 that every inactive railroad employee who may
have cause to bring suit against the railroad is concerned; 39 4 that many
companies are involved in the same litigation; 3 95 that 130 firms received
payments of which the Government now seeks return; 39 that seven suits
are pending because of the allegedly defective airplanes involved in the
instant case; 311 that throughout the country there are 235 cases which
may arise concerning the question;89 8 that there are a host of cases on
the point involving between three hundred million and one billion dol-
lars; 399 and that many thousands of cases bearing on the issue are
pending.
40 0
The Government, particularly successful in securing review of peti-
tions for certiorari, had over seventy-five per cent granted in the current
387 United States v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 359 U.S. 314 (1959), affirming in part
and reversing in part 255 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1958).
388 Kaiser v. United States, 262 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S.
1010 (1959) (No. 858).
389 Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87 (1959), affirming 258 F.2d 568, 575 (6th
Cir. 1958).
390 United States v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 361 U.S. 78 (1959), reversing 258
F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1958).
391 McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960), affirming
259 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
392 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), reversing and remanding 254 F.2d
944 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
393 Scales v. United States, 260 F.2d 21 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 917
(1958) (No. 488), reargument ordered, 360 U.S. 924 (1959).
394 Pennsylvania R.R. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548 (1959), reversing and remanding
258 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1958).
39, Swift & Co. v. United States, 257 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
837 (1958).
396 National Biscuit Co. v. United States, 257 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 837 (1958).
397 Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 910 (1958).
398 General Pub. Util. Corp. v. United States, 358 U.S. 831 (1958) (denying
certiorari to the Court of Claims, unreported).
39R. H. Macy & Co. v. United States, 255 F.2d 884 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 880 (1958). The accuracy of this estimate was denied by the United States.
400 Bercut-Vandervoort & Co. v. United States, 359 U.S. 953 (1959) (denying
certiorari to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, unreported).
This was pointed out by the dissent in the United States Customs Court, 151 F. Supp.
942, 953 (Cust. Ct. 1957).
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term.40 1 This is due to the Solicitor General's extreme selectivity as well
as to excellence of presentation. In Barr v. Matteo,40 2 the issue was
whether allegedly defamatory statements made by the acting director of
the Office of Rent Stabilization in the exercise of his duties were abso-
lutely privileged. The Government demonstrated substantial significance
by listing various important and not so important officials who were cov-
ered by the result in the court of appeals. In SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co.,40 3 resolution was sought as to whether the sale of variable
annuity contracts was subject to SEC regulation. The Government con-
tended that the adverse ruling below enabled all investment companies
to escape regulation by including an optional annuity clause in their se-
curities. The question in United States v. Republic Steel Corp.404 was
the legality of respondent's dumping of industrial solids in navigable
streams without the permission of the Army Engineers. The Government
urged that its position had saved the United States three and one-half
million dollars since 1949, that the issue involved every navigable stream
in the country, and that the interpretation of the Rivers & Harbors Act
of 1899,405 required by the question presented, would apply to numerous
factual situations. In FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n,40 the Government
alleged that more than half the complaints brought by the FTC involve
companies which solicit by mail in foreign states. The issue presented
in United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land 40 7 was whether a government
condemnation proceeding barred consideration-under the doctrine of elec-
tion of remedies-of the validity of the lessor-government's prior revocation
of a lease on the now condemned property; and further, if consideration of
revocation was not precluded, whether the lease was revocable under the
circumstances. The Government convinced the Court that the adverse de-
termination below placed "severe restriction . . . on the ability of the
United States to get, quickly, land it may need for government pur-
poses," 408 inasmuch as the Government would be forced to forego con-
demnation until the validity of lease revocation could be determined.
A small number of private litigants equalled the Government's usually
excellent presentation by stressing the general importance of the issue
rather than their own personal plight. Fouts v. United States 409 is demon-
strative: petitioner stated that his case afforded the Court an excellent
401 A study made shows that in 1955, 61.5%, in 1956, 73.8%, and in 1957, 64.5%
of the Government's petitions for certiorari were granted. Harlan, Manning the
Dikes, 13 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 541, 548 (1958).
402360 U.S. 564 (1959), reversing 256 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
403359 U.S. 65 (1959), reversing 257 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
404 264 F.2d 289 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 80 S. Ct. 884 (1960).
405 30 Stat. 1151, 1152, 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 407 (1958).
406 362 U.S. 293 (1960), reversing 262 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1959). For a state-
ment of the case see text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
407360 U.S. 328 (1959), reversing 258 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1958).
408 360 U.S. at 331.
409 258 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 884 (1958). See prior dis-
cussion of this case at notes 156-58 supra and accompanying text.
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opportunity to decide whether the constitutional right to counsel accrues
immediately after indictment or only after arraignment. In Garland v.
Torre,410 petitioner, pointing to respected scholarly authority 4 1 and
persuasive English -cases,412 urged that the decision below impeded the
gathering of news throughout the United States. In Cohen v. Public
Housing Administration,413 petitioner demonstrated that the FHA's exten-
sive operations were racially segregated in more than one local area. The
petitioner in Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles 414 alleged
that every state which has contacts with migratory assets was concerned.
And in Baldwin v. Board of Tax-Roll Corrections,415 the issue was whether
petitioner's property, leased to the United States and used as a post office,
was exempt from state property taxation by the Enabling Act,416 which
exempted land owned by the United States or reserved to its use. Peti-
tioner pointed out that this same immunity was granted by every state
admitted to the Union after 1888.
But, similar to other review-seeking endeavors of litigants, some of
the attempts to demonstrate an issue's general significance were totally
frivolous. In Charles H. Tompkins Co. v. Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc.,4 17
involving the construction of a narrow point in a particular contract, peti-
tioner wrote that "the great volume of contracts written throughout the
United States renders the issues in this case of primary importance." In
a case dealing with the constitutionality of segregated restrooms in a state
courthouse,418 petitioner assigned the impact of the particular discriminatory
practice at issue upon foreign policy as a reason for the Court's review 4 19
The importance of a reply by the successful party below to his op-
ponent's petition is obvious.420  But, unfortunately, a great many replies
do no more than discuss the correctness of the lower court decision. A
limited number do, however, address themselves to showing the absence of
issues worthy of the Court's attention. In SEC v. Insurance Sec. Inc.,
42 1
410 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). See prior dis-
cussion of this case in text following note 122 supra.
4 1 1 CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 497 (1947).
412 Georgius v. Vice Chancellor, [1949] 1 K.B. 729; Lawson v. Odhams Press
Ltd., [1949] 1 K.B. 129.
413257 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 928 (1959). See prior
discussion of this case at notes 77-79 smpra and accompanying text.
414 51 Cal. 2d 314, 333 P.2d 323 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1001 (1959). See
prior discussion of this case at notes 131-33 sipra and accompanying text.
415 331 P.2d 412 (Okla. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 926 (1959).
416Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, § 3(3), 34 Stat. 270.
417 259 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 874 (1958).
418 Dawley v. City of Norfolk, 260 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 935 (1959).
419 The Fourth Circuit held that the district court was within its discretion in
instructing petitioner to seek his remedy in the state courts.
420 ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES § 315 (2d ed. Wolfson & Kurland 1951).
421254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958). See prior dis-
cussion of this case at notes 128-30 supra and accompanying text.
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respondent said that there was no conflict, no case pending and the only
similar case ever litigated was not directly in point. In a case 422 involving
United States seizure of a coal mine, the Government argued that no other
seizure cases were pending in the Court of Claims and that actions on all
similar seizures were now barred by the statute of limitations; 423 in a
case 424 involving the Lucas Act425 the Government pointed to the rarity
of such cases: only two were known to be pending. In a case 426 involving
a claim before the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, the Government
asserted that this was the last litigation of its kind and that even if peti-
tioner were to succeed in the Supreme Court, it would fail on remand
inasmuch as the Commission was no longer in existence; 4
2 7 and in a case 428
concerning sales of ships by the United States Maritime Commission, the
Government alleged that there was no longer statutory authorization 
429
for the sales and that only six cases might be affected by a Court decision.
In this area, too, the majority of well drafted replies were framed by the
Government.
Extensive Argument on the Merits
Evidently, even in the area of direct conflict, the attitude of the peti-
tioning bar is that the certworthiness of a case is enhanced by extensive
argument on the law. While the correctness of the legal decision below
may be relevant to the Court's determination to grant or deny certiorari,
430
extended argument on this point is neither necessary nor desirable.
431
Support for this statement can be found in Robert C. Herd & Co. v.
Krawill Mach. Corp.,432 where the three-page certiorari petition rested
solely on the conflict.
433
422 Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl. 796, 161 F. Supp. 952 (1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 912 (1959).
42328 U.S.C. §2401(a) (1958).
424 Lane Indus., Inc. v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl. 712, 162 F. Supp. 443, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958).
425 60 Stat. 902 (1946), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 106 (1958) (compiler's note).
426 First Nat'l City Bank v. Gillilland, 257 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 837 (1958).
427 69 Stat. 574 (1955), 22 U.S.C. § 1641o (1958).
428 Alaska S.S. Co. v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 399, 158 F. Supp. 361, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 834 (1958).
429 The original sale was authorized by Act of March 8, 1946, ch. 82, § 2, 60
Stat. 41.
430 See notes 183-200 supra and accompanying text.
431 "Only in exceptional cases is any but cursory discussion of the merits appro-
priate in the petition at all." Frankfurter & Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court
at the October Term, 1933, 48 HAnv. L. REV. 238, 265 (1934).
432 359 U.S. 297 (1959), affirming 256 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1958).
433 The court of appeals holding conflicted with A. M. Collins & Co. v. Panama
Ry., 197 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1952).
THE COURT, THE BAR, AND CERTIORARI
Length
Though the most effective petitions are limited in length,43 4 the
majority of those presented are far too verbose.43 5 It is believed that an
average length of twelve to fifteen pages is sufficient for all but a few
cases. A high percentage of the surplusage in the petitions, and a great
many papers in their entirety, deal exclusively with an evaluation of the
correctness of the decision below,43 6 never addressing themselves to the
significance of the case for Supreme Court review.43' Many pages are
devoted to discussion of issues most unlikely to attract the Court's attention:
for example, sufficiency of the evidence in commonplace civil litigation,438
everyday problems of admissibility of evidence, 439 and technical objections
to jury charges.440 It has been elsewhere observed 441 that one of Rule 19's
criteria 442 for review from a court of appeals-extreme departure from
normal judicial proceedings-may well cause many petitions concerning
insignificant issues. Since this particular criterion is rarely invoked suc-
434 See text accompanying notes 430-33 supra.
435 Probably the most egregious example discovered was a petition of 162 pages
(exclusive of appendices) which argued solely the merits of the decision below includ-
ing such issues as sufficiency of the evidence, admissability of certain evidence, and
the propriety of certain jury instructions. Should the petition have been filed at all,
Moth of these pages would have sufficed. United States v. De Lucia, 262 F.2d 610
(7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959). Another example was a petition
for certiorari of 77 pages (exclusive of appendices) which provoked a brief in oppo-
sition (evidently not to be outdone) of 102 pages. UMW v. Meadow Creek Coal
Co., 263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959). Others, although
not so spectacularly long, presented many more pages than required by their cases.
For example, in Theriot v. Mercer, 262 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
983 (1959), petitioner devoted 52 pages to criticize, point-by-point, the errors found
by the court of appeals in its reversal of petitioner's jury verdict in a negligence
action. This petition should never have been filed in any event. On the other hand,
in Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959), reversing 258 F.2d 94 (10th Cir.
1958), petitioner took but 3 pages to present his case for review. Certiorari was
granted. 358 U.S. 892 (1958).
436 E.g., George Sollitt Constr. Co. v. Gateway Erectors, Inc., 260 F.2d 165 (7th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 925 (1959); Doane Agricultural Serv., Inc. v.
Coleman, 254 F.2d 40 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 818 (1958).
437 It must be noted that when the case is utterly lacking in any such significance
it is an impossible task to do so.
438E.g., Giguere v. United States Steel Corp., 262 F.2d 189 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 934 (1959); Cartellone v. Lehmann, 255 F.2d 101 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 867 (1958).
439E.g., Central R.R. v. Jules S. Sottnek Co., 258 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959) ; De Fonce Constr. Co. v. City of Miami, 256 F.2d
425 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958).
440 E.g., Brinkley v. Pennsylvania R.R., 254 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 865 (1958) ; Butler v. Watts, 103 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 926 (1959).
441 Frankfurter & Hart, sipra note 431, at 274.
442 "Where a court of appeals . . . has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a
lower court, as to call for an exercise of this court's power of supervision." U.S.
Sup. CT. P. 19(1) (b).
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cessfully 443 and since Rule 19 would, in any event, remain sufficiently
flexible 444 to insure "supervision," the efficacy of retaining this criterion
may be questioned. All in all, it must be said that the general quality of
the draftsmanship is poor.
C. Effect of Previous Supreme Court Action
1. Prior Decisions on the Merits
It is indeed a rarity for the Supreme Court to specifically overrule
one of its prior decisions.445 Nonetheless, numerous petitions present issues
which the Court has previously decided adversely to the petitioner's con-
tention. Although most of the questions would appear significant if they
were to be considered de novo, these petitioners are probably ill-advised
in seeking review absent some indication 446 that the Court might be in-
clined to reverse itself.
However, one case of singular interest is Yancy v. United States,
447
where petitioner was convicted under the narcotics law on two counts--one
for purchased" and one for sale 44 9 -and given consecutive sentences.
There was direct proof of sale but the conviction of purchasing was based
solely on a presumption arising from possession of the narcotics which were
later sold. Certiorari was granted less than a month after the Court, in
Harris v. United States,4" affirmed consecutive sentences for a conviction
on two counts (one for purchase and one for receiving and concealing)
under the same statutes. Both convictions in Harris were based entirely
on presumptions arising from the fact of possession. 5 ' The two cases
seem not to be distinguishable, nor is the reason behind the Court's grant
of certiorari readily perceived.4
2
443 Frankfurter & Hart, stupra note 431, at 274; Harper & Leibowitz, What the
Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1952 Termn, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 427, 447
(1954).
444 "The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the courtes dis-
cretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered...." U.S. Sup.
CT. R_ 19(1).
445A study has been made which reveals that this has occurred less than one
hundred times in almost 150 years. See generally Blaustein & Field, "Overruling"
Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MicH. L. Rav. 151 (1958).
446E.g., in Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958), both the concurring and
dissenting opinions expressed desire to reconsider Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S.
487 (1944).
447 252 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 941 (1959) (No. 792).
4 4
8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 4704.
449 65 Stat. 767 (1951), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1958); INT. REv. CoDE
oF 1954, § 7237.
450 359 U.S. 19 (1959). See also Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
451 It is to he noted that the petition for certiorari was filed before the Gore
and Harris decisions.
452 For a contrary statutory interpretation argument see Note, Consecutive Sen-
tences in Single Prosecutions: Judicial Multiplication of Statutory Penalties, 67 YALE
L.J. 916, 927-29 (1958).
THE COURT, THE BAR, AND CERTIORARI
Several petitioners, recognizing that their contentions were clearly
precluded by prior Court decisions, forthrightly urged reversal. One such
petitioner,453 convicted in a state court which admitted evidence seized
illegally by state officers, asserted that Wolf v. Colorado 454 should be over-
turned; another 455 asked the Court to reverse United States v. White,456
which held that a corporation is not entitled to the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination; still another 457 sought re-examination of Eilen-
becker v. District Court,458 which held that no federal right to jury trial
exists in cases of state contempt convictions.
Less candid were those petitioners who ignored the adverse state of the
law regarding their contentions. Thus it was alleged 459 that the penalty
provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 460 were uncon-
stitutional; 461 that a survivor's depreciable basis in property originally held
in the entireties should be valued at market value at date of death rather
than at cost; 462 that a court of one state has no jurisdiction to find lack of
domicile in a sister state so as to collaterally impeach a divorce decree of
the sister state; 43 that a state immunity statute which affords no protec-
tion against federal prosecution violates fifth amendment rights; 46 that a
defense of res judicata may be raised in a denaturalization proceeding by
introducing the prior naturalization order.46 5 And it was contended 4
66
that an order for delivery of possession entered on a declaration of taking
in a federal condemnation proceeding was a final order appealable to the
453 People v. McIntyre, 15 Ill. 2d 350, 155 N.E.2d 45 (1958), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 917 (1959).
454 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
455 United States v. 3963 Bottles, 265 F.2d 332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
931 (1959).
456 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
45 7 Sarner v. Sarner, 28 N.J. 519, 147 A.2d 244, appeal dismissed, cert. denied,
359 U.S. 533 (1959).
458 134 U.S. 31 (1890).
459 Corpstein v. United States, 262 F2d 200 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 966 (1959).
460 52 Stat. 39, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1366 (1958).
461 The constitutionality of the act was upheld in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942). See also United States v. Haley, 358 U.S. 644 (1959).
462 Faraco v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
925 (1959). Directly contrary to this position is Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U.S.
109 (1933).
463 Colby v. Colby, 217 Md. 35, 141 A.2d 506, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 838 (1958).
Directly contrary to this position is Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
464 Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), afflrmning in part and reversing it part
on other gromunds 167 Ohio St. 295, 147 N.E.2d 847 (1958). Knapp v. Schweitzer,
357 U.S. 371 (1958), forecloses this argument.
465 United States v. De Lucia, 256 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
836 (1958). This argument was foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Knauer v. United
States, 328 U.S. 654, 671-73 (1946).
466 Hartshorn v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 359 U.S.
984 (1959) (denial of certiorari to the District of Columbia Circuit, unreported).
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court of appeals. 467 In view of the extreme infrequency of Supreme Court
reversal of itself,4 68 the number of petitions urging the Court to take this
very action is surprisingly large.
2. Prior Denial of Certiorari-Similar Issue
Although it has been observed that "flexibility is the essence of cer-
tiorari, and it is by no means unknown for the Court to grant the writ to
consider an issue which at an earlier time it had refused to review," 46 9
it is not unreasonable to predict that, absent a subsequently arising conflict
or circumstances enhancing the importance or ripeness of a case for review,
prior denials of certiorari (other than those attributable to defects in juris-
dictional prerequisites) will in most cases be followed by refusals to review
cases presenting a similar issue. The exception to this general proposi-
tion is illustrated by two cases on the 1958 docket: Melrose Distillers,
Inc. v. United States 470 and Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal.471 As
was the circumstance in Melrose, the Court had previously denied cer-
tiorari on two cases involving the Glus issue-one with identical facts but
an opposite result 4 72 and one with a similar result.4 73 It is to be noted
with regard to both Melrose and Glus that the courts of appeals were still
in conflict when certiorari was granted.
Despite the general tendency of the Court, many cases present issues
similar to those previously denied review. The decision 474 that dis-
tributors of punchboards and pushcards in interstate commerce are subject
to the Federal Trade Commission Act 475 has been denied review at least
three times;476 the holding 477 that a transfer 478 of surplus to capital in-
cident to a stock dividend results in the imposition of a documentary
467 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958). Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945),
expressly holds that such an order is not final. Furthermore, petitioner did not invoke
the interlocutory appeals procedure under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958).
468 See note 445 supra.
469 Harlan, Some Aspects of the Judicial Process in the Supreme Court of the
United States, 33 AUSTL. L.J. 108, 113 (1959).
470 359 U.S. 271 (1959), affirming 258 F.2d 726 (4th Cir. 1958). See prior full
discussion of this point notes 18-24 supra and accompanying text.
471 359 U.S. 231. (1959), reversing 253 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1958). For a statement
of this case see notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 112-16 supra
and accompanying text.
472 Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 178 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 919 (1950).
473 Damiano v. Pennsylvania R.R., 161 F.2d 534 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
762 (1947).
474 James v. FTC, 253 F.2d 78 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 821 (1958).
47538 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§45(a) (1), (c) (1958).
476 Seymour Sales Co. v. FTC, 216 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 928 (1955); U.S. Printing & Novelty Co. v. FTC, 204 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 830 (1953); Feitler v. FTC, 201 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 814 (1953).
477 Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. McMahon, 253 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 829 (1958).
478 Since N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAws § 13 prohibits the increase of the capital stock
account incident to the declaration of a stock dividend, the "transfer" in the instant
case consisted of converting earned surplus into capital surplus rather than converting
earned surplus into capital stock-the normal procedure. The difference is one of
form, not of substance.
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stamp tax 479 on the stock issued has formerly been denied review.480
And certiorari had previously been denied 481 on the issue presented by
Bennett v. The Mormacteal.48 2  Two cases 483 successfully challenged the
constitutionality of a Louisiana statute 484 conditioning college admission on
the approval-without established objective standards-of high school prin-
cipals and superintendents of education; petitioners sought review despite
a recent denial of certiorari by the Court in another Fifth Circuit case 4
8 5
involving a Louisiana pupil assignment statute 486 without such objective
standards. Review was also sought from a decision 48 7 upholding, against
a thirteenth amendment challenge, a state statute 48 8 requiring employers
to withhold employees' gross income tax; although, as petitioner pointed
out, the Supreme Court had never examined such a contention on the
merits, it had declined to grant certiorari in a case 489 sanctioning the with-
holding provisions of the Federal Insurance Contribution Act.490 And
the decision 491 that rate increases pursuant to a "favored nation" clause
in a natural gas sale contract are "rate changes" under the Natural Gas
Act 492 has been denied review at least twice 493 before.
Other examples: Court consideration of the decision 4 94  that
mandamus 495 will not lie to nullify a federal district judge's order grant-
479 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 247, § 1802(a), 53 Stat. 196.
480 United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 816, 142 F. Supp.
948, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1015 (1956).
481 Smith v. The Mormacdale, 198 F.2d 849 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 908 (1953).
482 254 F.2d 138 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 817 (1958). See prior dis-
cussion of this case in text accompanying notes 187-89 .supra.
483 Louisiana State Bd. of Educ. v. Lark, 252 F.2d 372 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 820 (1958) ; Board of Supervisors v. Ludley, 252 F.2d 372 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 819 (1958).
4 84 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:2131-35 (Supp. 1959).
485 Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Rush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 921 (1957).
488 La. Acts 1954, No. 556, § 1.
48 7Akers v. Handley, 238 Ind. 288, 149 N.E.2d 692, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 907
(1958).
4 88 IND. ANN. STAT. § 64-2617 (Supp. 1959).
489 Abney v. Campbell, 206 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924
(1954).
490 Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 639 (1935), as amended, ch. 468, 62 Stat. 438 (1950).
491 Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 255 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 804 (1958).
492 52 Stat 822 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1958).
493 Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Memphis Natural Gas Co., 162 F.2d 388
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 770 (1947) ; see Cities Serv. Gas Producing Co. v.
FPC, 233 F.2d 726 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 911 (1956); cf. Continental
Oil Co. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 966 (1957);
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
967 (1957).
494 Lemon v. Druffel, 253 F.2d 680 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 821 (1958).
49528 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1958).
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ing transfer 496 to another forum had previously been withheld.497  And
the determination 498 that the applicable statute of limitations4 99 does not
bar the Government from offsetting subsequently determined excess freight
charges against claims of carriers under the Transportation Act 500 has
recently been denied review by the Court.50 1 A state taxation case also
fails into this category: in International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot,50 2 an appor-
tioned state net income tax 503 on a foreign corporation whose only contact
with the taxing state was regular solicitation by salesmen was upheld
by the Louisiana courts; the Supreme Court had only recently denied
review of an identical attack on the same statute.
50 4
Situations may arise, however, in which an earlier decision, apparently
conflicting with the present holding, has been denied certiorari. Now
that a conflict exists, the prior denial should not be indicative of the same
result in the present case; in fact, inasmuch as the correctness of the lower
court decision may conceivably have been a factor in the failure to grant
the writ in the prior case,505 the present one is all the more certworthy.
However, certiorari was denied in a decision 506 which was later alleged
to be in conflict with Ferraiolo v. Newman; 507 perhaps the present denial
in Ferraiolo is explainable because of the distinction between the cases
drawn by the Sixth Circuit 5 08 or because of the demonstrated infre-
quency 509 of the factual setting. And, in Curran v. Delaware,510 certiorari
-previously denied in a similar case 511 reaching the opposite result-was
again refused. However, the prior case is distinguishable in that the
49628 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958).
497 Great No. Ry. v. Hyde, 245 F.2d 537 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 872
(1957).
498 United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 250 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 821 (1958).
499 Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, § 4, 62 Stat. 1070 (1948), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §714b(c) (1958).
500 Ch. 772, § 332, 54 Stat. 955 (1940).
501 Union Pac. RR. v. United States, 137 Ct. Cl. 931, 147 F. Supp. 483, cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 950 (1957).
502 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
5 03LA. REv. STAT. §§47:21, :31 (Supp. 1952).
504 Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector, 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958),
appeal disnzissed, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 28 (1959).
505 See text accompanying notes 183-200 supra.
506 Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 761 (1947).
507259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959). For prior
discussion of this case see notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
508 See text above and following note 45 supra.
509 See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
510 259 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 948 (1959). See prior
discussion of this case in text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
511 Schechtman v. Foster, 172 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
924 (1950).
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decision rested on the alternative ground that petitioner there failed to
exhaust state remedies.
Finally, there are situations in which the Supreme Court has regu-
larly denied review in all cases on a similar issue, regardless of result.
One explanation may be simply that the Court has announced a general
rule in the area, and the cases subsequently arising, while reaching differ-
ing results, merely involve application of the general rule. Thus, in Wright
v. United States,512 a civilian firefighter at a naval installation sued under
the Federal Employees Pay Act 513 for overtime wages for hours spent
at the base off duty but subject to call. General standards concerning
what constitutes "working time" were set down by the Court in 1944; 514
since that time all cases involving the problem have been denied review.515
In other cases all that can be said is that the Court, declining to announce
a rule, has apparently decided to leave resolution of the problem to the
lower courts 51 -- at least for the time being. Thus, with regard to the
issue presented in Seven-Up Co. v. Blue Note, Inc.,5 17 the Supreme Court
has denied certiorari in cases which appear to reach dissimilar results.
518
3. Prior Denial-Similar Issue-Same Petitioner
It is axiomatic that a petitioner who has once been denied review on
an issue properly presented to the Court will have little chance of success
when he presents the same or similar issue to the Court a second time.
A notable exception is that of a state prisoner seeking federal habeas
corpus.51 9 Several petitioners in cases appearing on the 1958 docket 5
20
unsuccessfully asked for certiorari to a court of appeals, certiorari to the
512 359 U.S. 1001 (1959) (denying certiorari to the Court of Claims, unreported).
513 59 Stat. 295 (1945), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-58 (1958).
514 Slidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Armour & Co. v. Wantock,
323 U.S. 126 (1944).
515 General Elec. Co. v. Porter, 208 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 951 (1954) (plaintiff recovered); Glenn L. Martin Neb. Co. v. Culldn, 197 F.2d
981 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 866 (1952) (plaintiff recovered); Bell v.
Porter, 159 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 813 (1947) (plaintiff
did not recover); Bowers v. Remington Rand, Inc., 159 F.2d 114 (7th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 330 U.S. 843 (1947) (plaintiff did not recover) ; Rokey v. Day & Zim-
merman, Inc., 156 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 842 (1947) (plain-
tiff did not recover) ; Sawyer v. United States, 138 Ct. Cl. 152, cert. denied, 355 U.S.
868 (1957) (plaintiff did not recover); Conn v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 422, 68
F. Supp. 966 (1946), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 757 (1947) (plaintiff did not recover).
516 Cf. 108 U. PA. L. REv. 601, 605 n.36 (1960).
517260 F.?d 584 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959). See prior
discussion of this case in text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
518 Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. New Cut Rate Liquors, Inc., 245 F.2d 453 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 837 (1957); Kelly, Inc. v. Lehigh Nav. Coal Co., 151
F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946).
519 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), requires that the petitioner seek
certiorari to the highest state court before beginning the federal habeas corpus pro-
cedure. See generally Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for
State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. Rv. 461, 473 (1960).
520 MacKenna v. Ellis, 263 F.2d 35 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 935 (1959)
(certiorari previously denied: MacKenna v. Texas, 355 U.S. 851 (1957)) ; Williams
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state courts having been previously denied. One notably persistent peti-
tioner appeared three times on the docket-first seeking review of the
original conviction; 521 then twice seeking review from denials of state
habeas corpus; 522 and all three times presenting a multiplicity of similar
contentions.
2 3
Unfortunately some litigants-even though not in the habeas corpus
class-are not to be discouraged; a sampling follows: the Supreme Court
in Morgenstern Chem. Co. v. Searle & Co.524 denied certiorari to a
Third Circuit decision which remanded a trademark infringement suit for
injunction but denied petitioner's claim for an accounting of profits; peti-
tioner again sought the accounting on remand in the district court, and
for the second time in the same Term unsuccessfully petitioned for cer-
tiorari.525  In Puritan Church Bldg. Fund v. United States,526 petitioner,
claiming exemption as a religious organization, 527 sought an income tax
refund; it had raised the identical issue when originally resisting payment
of the tax and certiorari had been denied. 528  In Ginsburg v. Sullivan,
529
petitioner, who suffered summary judgment in his prior libel suit to which
certiorari was denied,530 requested the Seventh Circuit to mandamus the
district court to hear his amended complaint which presented the same
claim.5 3' And in Furnish v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 petitioner
sought a declaratory judgment to void an order suspending him from
medical practice; he had litigated the identical issue in the state courts,
and that litigation also resulted in a denial of certiorari.5m
Several litigants attempted to circumvent a prior lower court decision
by contending that they were not in privity with the party against whom
v. Moore, 262 F.2d 335 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959) (certiorari
previously denied: Williams v. Texas, 355 U.S. 850 (1957)); Curran v. Delaware,
259 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 948 (1959) (certiorari previously
denied: Curran v. Delaware, 352 U.S. 913 (1956)); Florida ex rel. Thomas v.
Culver, 253 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 822 (1958) (certiorari pre-
viously denied: Thomas v. Florida, 354 U.S. 925 (1957)).
521 People v. Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 326 P.2d 457, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 866 (1958).
522 Wein v. California, 359 U.S. 992 (1959) (denying certiorari to the Supreme
Court of California, unreported); Wein v. California, 359 U.S. 942 (1959) (denying
certiorari to the Supreme Court of California, unreported).
523 For a particularly frivolous contention by this petitioner see notes 263-67 mipra
and accompanying text. See also notes 370-71 supra and accompanying text.
524 253 F.2d 390 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
525 262 F.2d 592 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 908 (1959).
526 256 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 927 (1959).
52 7 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 247, § 101 (6), 53 Stat. 876 (now INT. REv. CODE
oF 1954, § 501).
528 Puritan Church v. Commissioner, 209 F2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 975 (1954).
529 358 U.S. 882 (1958) (denying certiorari to Seventh Circuit, unreported).
530 Ginsburg v. Black, 237 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 911
(1957).
531The litigant was not to be easily foreclosed; he appeared pro se.
532257 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 882 (1958).
533 149 Cal. App. 2d 326, 308 P.2d 924, 309 P.2d 493 (Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 827 (1957).
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the adverse decision was rendered. Their position rejected, they sought
certiorari; in effect, this was their second appearance before the Court
on the same issue. Thus, in Gart v. Cole,58 4 petitioners sought to enjoin
federal and city officials from executing a housing redevelopment program
on the ground that sale of land to Fordham University was a violation
of religious freedom; certiorari had been denied in a state case raising
the identical issue brought by landowners and tenants who represented
the same classes as petitioners. 535 Somewhat similar is the interesting
situation presented by Hughes Transp., Inc. v. United States; 536 petitioner
therein had appeared as amicus curiae in a prior California case 537 before
the Supreme Court.
IV. THE STATE OF THE DOCKET
A. Substantive Content
A statistical examination of the Supreme Court's docket at the Octo-
ber Term 1958 evidences that a wide variety of subject matter was pre-
sented. The two most popular classes of claims concerned allegations of
the misapplication of federal criminal procedural safeguards and allegations
of unconstitutional state deprivations of some property interest; each of
these classes constituted about twelve per cent of the total number of cases
on the docket. Following closely were those cases involving federal admin-
istrative agencies, straight common-law diversity cases, and cases involv-
ing federal taxation; each accounted for about ten per cent of the total
number. Those categories constituting approximately five per cent each
were: alleged state deprivations of constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties;
admiralty problems; claims arising under sundry federal statutes; alleged
federal deprivation of civil liberties; patent, copyright and trademark prob-
lems; and labor law controversies. Finally, the two-to-three per cent
category included those cases dealing with Indian affairs, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, state disbarments, the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act, federal jurisdiction, racial discrimination, state and federal
contempt, state taxation, bankruptcy and antitrust.
B. Reasons for the Crowded Docket
Serious concern over the past, present and predictable size of the
Court's docket 5 38 illustrates the statement that "hosts of litigants will
534 263 F.2d 244 (,d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
535 64th St. Residences, Inc. v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 268, 150 N.E.2d
396, 174 N.Y.S.2d 1, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 907 (1958).
536 128 Ct Cl. 221, 168 F. Supp. 219 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 968 (1959).
See prior discussion of this case in text accompanying notes 138-41 supra.
537 Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
538 Harlan, Some Aspects of the Judicial Process in the Supreme Court of the
United States, 33 Ausm. LJ. 108, 114 (1959); S. R.s .No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. 39 (1937) (letter from Chief justice Hughes to Senator Wheeler).
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take appeals so long as there is a tribunal accessible." 539 Much of this
Note has already dealt with bad lawyering, which accounts for much of
the docket congestion. Other isolable causes will here be examined.
1. Federal Employers' Liability Act Cases
The Court's exercise of certiorari in FELA cases has been severely
criticized from the beginnings of this jurisdiction 540 to the present day,
and the issue continues to divide the present Court.541  However, it
would seem that the effect of Court review of run-of-the-mill FELA liti-
gation upon the total number of cases on the docket arises not from the
number of FELA cases presented-relatively few 54 2 -but from the larger
number of non-FELA cases which, in seeking review, apparently rely
upon the FELA review standard. Thus, two petitioners 543 against whom
verdicts were directed in diversity tort actions relied upon prior FELA
cases5 44 to support contentions that they had been deprived of their
seventh amendment right to jury trial. Likewise, non-FELA petitioners
who suffered appellate reversal of their jury verdict,545 judgment not
withstanding the verdict, 46 or summary judgment,547 or who had certain
issues withheld from the jury,548 alleged denial of their constitutional right
to jury trial. Inasmuch as the Court rarely 5 4 9 deals with such contentions
in other than FELA cases, it would seem that the granting of certiorari
in FELA cases in some measure contributes to the presence of these cases
539 Ibid.
540 Frankfurter & Landis, The Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925,
42 HAzv. L. REv. 1 (1928).
541 For the conflicting views of the members of the Court see Harris v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15 (1959).
542 Mr. Justice Douglas points out in Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra note
541, at 16-25, that only 109 FELA cases presenting issues of negligence or causation
under the act were filed from January 31, 1949 to October 19, 1959.
543 Sheptur v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 261 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1003 (1959) ; Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
544 The cases relied on were Schulz v. Pennsylvania R.R., 350 U.S. 523 (1956);
Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946); Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 321
U.S. 29 (1944).
545 E.g., State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v. Yszara, 263 F.2d 937 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 932 (1959) ; Theriot v. Mercer, 262 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 983 (1959); E. I. du Pont de Nernours & Co. v. Kissinger, 259
F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 950 (1959); Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Laborde, 257 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 928 (1959).
546 E.g., Sword v. Gulf Oil Corp., 251 F.2d 829 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
824 (1958).
547E.g., Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958).
54SE.g., Doane Agricultural Serv., Inc. v. Coleman, 254 F.2d 40 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 818 (1958); Hurst v. Gulf Oil Corp., 251 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 827 (1958).
549 See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959).
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on the Court's docket.550 This appears to be so despite the fact that the
bar should realize that FELA cases are in a category by themselves.
2. Diversity Cases
The Court's rules provide for review by certiorari where "a court
of appeals has . . decided an important state or territorial question in
a way in conflict with applicable state or territorial law." 551 Although it
is infrequently utilized, 552 this rule precipitates the filing of the large
number of common-law diversity cases 55 that reach the docket.554 These
allege direct conflict with the prevailing rule of the state concerning such
issues as whether a New Jersey corporation statute 5r5 requires directors'
approval of a profit-sharing plan; 556 the Texas duty of due care owed by
a storeowner to an invitee; 557 the Texas duty of inspection imposed on a
landowner; 558 the Oregon application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur; 5 9 the use of the equitable doctrine of clean hands in the Virgin
Islands; 560 the Texas application of the rule of absolute verity; 561 the
Louisiana and Texas doctrines governing the right of a seller to rescind a
contract upon breach of a condition precedent; 562 whether an Illinois
statute 56 3 making it unlawful for cattle to run at large permits the
defense of contributory negligence; 54 the Oklahoma doctrine of proximate
550 "There is, however, one thing the Court can do, albeit negatively. It must
be scrupulously careful to avoid taking cases which do not satisfy the criteria for
review, lest lawyers be led to believe that the rules governing certiorari are so
capriciously applied that their only prudent course is to 'take a chance' that their
petitions may find favour too." Harlan, supra note 538, at 115.
551 U.S. Sup. CT. R. 19(1)(b).
552 The rule has been criticized as having little value because of this. Harper
& Leibowitz, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1952 Term, 102 U.
PA. L. REv. 427, 445-46 (1954); see also Fey, The Supreme Court-An Operational
Survey, 4 CATHOLIC LAW. 64, 70 (1958).
553 Discussion in this section of the Note will be confined to those diversity cases
which present no federal question such as matters concerning federal jurisdiction or
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but which concern common-law matters such
as controversies of tort, contract or property.
554 There were filed approximately 4 times as many common-law diversity cases
as FELA cases, and they comprised slightly less than 10%, of the appellate docket.
555 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:9-1 to -5 (1937).
556 De Pova v. Camden Forge Co., 254 F.2d 248 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
816 (1958).
557 Thacker v. J. C. Penney Co., 254 F2d 672 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
820 (1958).
558 Sword v. Gulf Oil Corp., 251 F2d 829 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 824
(1958).
559 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 840 (1958).
560 Dreis v. Bishop, 257 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 914 (1959).
561 O'Boyle v. Bevil, 259 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
562 Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. River Brand Rice Mills, Inc., 259 F.2d 137
(2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946 (1959).
563 ILL. Awr. STAT. ch. 8, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1941).
564 Beiter v. Erb, 259 F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 953 (1959).
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cause; 565 and the New York rule of a manufacturer's liability for hidden
defects.5 66 Obviously, these are not issues befitting Supreme Court review.
While many diversity petitioners allege direct conflict with state or ter-
ritorial law, an even greater number do no more than argue the merits of
their case.567 Further evidence of the poor quality of the diversity peti-
tions is demonstrated by the fact that only a handful 568 mentioned Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins.569 Although the Court has apparently limited the
scope of this criterion in reframing its rules,570 the desirability of its reten-
tion at all may be open to question.
57 '
3. Identical Question Pending
The Court has followed a policy of granting certiorari in certain
cases that "present questions identical with, or related to, matters already
before [it] . . . on the merits." 572 A number of cases on the 1958
docket may be accounted for in this manner; however, there is little cor-
relation between their number and the consumption of the Court's time
inasmuch as these cases are usually disposed of simultaneously with the
similar case pending when certiorari was granted. In some, the subse-
quently filed case was decidedwith the pending case: petitioner in County
of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.5 73 alleged similarity with Martin v.
Creasy 574-- both cases involving the issue of federal district court absten-
tion. In Barr v. Matteo,575 petitioner contended that his case paralleled
that of Howard v. Lyons 57 k-both concerned defamation immunity of gov-
ernmental officials. In Taylor v. McElroy,577 similarity was alleged with
Green v. McElroy 57 8 -the cases involved government procedures for
565 Pryor v. Lee C. Moore Corp., 262 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 902 (1959).
566 Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 1013 (1959).
567 E.g., McDonald v. O'Meara, 259 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 910 (1959); Doane Agricultural Serv. Inc. v. Coleman, 254 F.2d 40 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 818 (1958).
568E.g., Taormina Corp. v. Escobedo, 254 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 827 (1958); Wegmann v. Mannino, 253 F.2d 627 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 824 (1958).
569 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
570 The former criterion was "where a . . . court of appeals . . . has decided
an important question of local law in a way probably in conflict with applicable local
decisions. . . ." Former U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 38(5) (b), 306 U.S. 718 (1939). (Em-
phasis added.) Compare with the current rule in text accompanying note 551 supra.
571 See also discussion accompanying notes 441-44 supra and accompanying text.
572 ROBRTSON & KIRxHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPEME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES § 339 (2d ed. Wolfson & Kurland 1951).
573 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
574 360 U.S. 219 (1959).
575 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
576 360 U.S. 593 (1959).
577360 U.S. 709 (1959).
578 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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industrial security. Petitioner in Wilson v. Bohlender 57 9 contended that
McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo 580 and Kinsella v. United
States ex rel. Singleton 581 were similar-the issue of military prosecu-
tions overseas being present in all. And the issue in Commissioner v.
Glover 58 2 was represented as similar to that in Commissioner v. Hansen,
8 3
while petitioner in Baird v. Commissioner 58 4 alleged identity with both
Glover and Hansen--all three cases involved the issue of time of includi-
bility in a dealer's income of amounts held in reserve by his finance com-
panies. In other instances, the subsequently filed case was taken and
reversed per curiam after the pending case was decided: petitioners in
Aho v. Jacobsen 585 and McDaniel v. The Lisholt 58 6 alleged similarity with
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique 587-- all cases involving
the issue of a shipowner's standard of duty to licensees. In United States v.
Colonial Chevrolet Corp.588 petitioner alleged similarity with Glover,
Hansen and Baird.
An interesting variation was presented by Mills v. Louisiana; 5 8 9
petitioner stressed affinity to Knapp v. Schweitzer,590 undecided at the
time of the filing of the Mills petition. Certiorari in Mills was granted
after Knapp was decided 591 and the case was then affirmed per curiam
on the authority of Knapp. Apparently, there was a sufficient question
of federal-state collaboration in Mills to cause at least four Justices 
5 9 2
to feel that Knapp might not be dispositive.
In still other cases, the subsequently filed petition may be "held"
until disposition of the pending case; 593 certiorari is then denied when
the lower court decision is in accord with the Court's decision in the pending
case: 594 petitioner in Schaeffer v. Commissioner 595 alleged similarity with
579 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
50 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
581 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
582 360 U.S. 446 (1959).
583 Ibid.
584 Ibid.
585 359 U.S. 25 (1959).
58359 U.S. 26 (1959).
587358 U.S. 625 (1959).
588 360 U.S. 716 (1959).
589 360 U.S. 230 (1959). See prior discussion of the problem presented by this
case at text accompanying notes 123-27 supra.
590 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
591 Knapp was decided on June 30, 1958; the petition for certiorari in Mills was
filed on May 29, 1958, and certiorari was granted on October 13, 1958, 358 U.S. 810
(Nos. 74, 75).
592 The Court's settled practice is that the affirmative vote of four Justices is
required to grant certiorari and to note probable jurisdiction. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959) (separate opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan).
593 Boskey, Mechanics of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction, 46 CoLUm.
L. REv. 255, 257-58 (1946).
594 See generally ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 572, at § 339.
595 258 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 917 (1959).
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Hansen, Glover and Baird; 596 perhaps the Court "held" this case rather
than consolidating it with the others 597 because petitioner, appearing pro
se, might not have added significantly to the clarification of the issue. In
Hill v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,5 89 similarity with United N.Y. &
N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki 599 was asserted-both cases,
apparently in conflict, involved the issue of choice of federal or state law
in a wrongful death action based upon a maritime tort. And appellant
in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector 600 alleged similarity with
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota 6 0°-both con-
cerned the issue of what activities of a foreign corporation form a nexus
sufficient to subject it to taxation by the taxing state.
Some petitioners, cognizant of the practice of the Court on similar
cases, contrive unsuccessfully to bring their cases within it. Thus in
Brewster v. United States, 50 2 the Government, alleging similarity with
Flaxer v. United States 603 and Barenblatt v. United States,60 4 argued
that all involved the issue of congressional authorization of its committees;
but, inasmuch as each case concerned a different committee, consolidation
of the cases would not appear to be helpful. However, the Government's
reliance upon the similarity of the pending cases to illustrate the general
importance of the issue raised in Brewster seems sound.
4. Action by the Supreme Court and the Courts Below
In the past the Court has assigned as a reason for reviewing a par-
ticular case that the issue presented-an important federal question-was
specifically left open by a previous case.0 5 Such a situation gives addi-
tional encouragement to a petitioner whose case raises the issue previously
left open. In Rios v. United States,60 petitioner pointed out that "it has
remained an open question in this Court whether evidence obtained solely
by state agents in an illegal search may be admissible in federal court
despite the Fourth Amendment." 607 And in the three New York Com-
596 360 U.S. 446 (1959). See text accompanying notes 582-84, 588 supra.
597 Petitioner urged these alternatives upon the Court; the Government, in its
memorandum suggested that the case be held pending disposition of the others.
598251 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
599 358 U.S. 613 (1959).
600 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958), appeal disnissed, cert. denied, 359 U.S.
28 (1959). See notes 502-04 supra and accompanying text
001358 U.S. 450 (1959).
602 255 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 842 (1958). See text accom-
panying notes 109-10 supra.
603 358 U.S. 147 (1958).
604 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
605 E.g., Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 499 (1950) ; Morris
v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422, 425-26 (1947).
606256 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 965 (1959) (No. 40,
Misc., renumbered No. 854).
607 Quoting from Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 102 n.10 (1957).
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mission of Investigation Contempt Cases,608 petitioner pointed out that
the Court has not decided "whether, in a case of such collaboration between
state and federal officers, the defendant could successfully assert his privilege
in the state proceeding." 609 However, by no means should all instances
of the Court's abstention from deciding a particular issue be read as encour-
aging subsequent review. In Romero v. International Terminal Operat-
ing Co.,610 the Court left open the question of "whether the District Court
may submit to the jury the 'pendent' claims under the general maritime
law in the event that a cause of action [under the Jones Act] be found to
exist"; 611 however, it appeared to do so simply because Romero did not
present the issue. This nevertheless encouraged the petition in Bartholo-
mew v. Universe Tankships, Inc. 612 Moreover, the Government's peti-
tions in McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo 613 and Kinsella v.
United States ex rel. Singleton 614 specifically mentioned that civilian em-
ployees and military dependents charged with noncapital crimes were ex-
cluded from consideration by the Court in Reid v. Covert; 615 but it is
obvious that the reason for the Court's exclusion in Reid was to limit
the scope of its decision. The fundamental reason for review of Guagliardo
and Singleton was the importance of the question.
616
The fact that the Supreme Court has been known to review obscure
cases of no general importance simply to correct patent error or injustice (1
also encourages litigants with cases generally not worthy of review. Thus,
in Coleman v. Mountain Mesa Uranium Corp.,618 where the issue con-
cerned the abandonment of property, petitioner admitted that his case was
608 Commission of Investigation v. Lombardozzi, 5 N.Y.2d 1026, 158 N.E.2d 250,
185 N.Y.S.2d 550, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 930 (Miranda, Riccobono, Castellano), appeal
dismissed as moot, 361 U.S. 7 (Lombardozzi), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 10 (1959) (Man-
cuso). See prior discussion of these cases in text accompanying notes 123-27 supra.
609 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 380 (1958).
610 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
611 Id. at 381.
612 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959).
613 361 U.S. 281 (1960), affirming 259 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
614 361 U.S. 234 (1960), affirming 164 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.W. Va. 1958).
615 354 U.S. 1, 22-23, 45, 75 (1957).
616 An interesting twist is found in a case on appeal: in Steinbeck v. Gerosa,
4 N.Y.2d 302, 151 N.E.2d 170, 175 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 39 (1958),
appellant, arguing in his jurisdictional statement that his case had merit, relied upon the
fact that two Justices had dissented from the denial of certiorari in a case presenting a
similar issue. Corona Daily Independent v. City of Corona, 346 U.S. 833 (1953).
Evidently, it was appellant's reasoning that inasmuch as two members of the Court
had at one time apparently agreed with him, a strong possibility existed that other
members of the Court might now share this view. On the other hand, it might per-
suasively be argued that the noting of dissents from denials of certiorari indicates
that the question has been thoroughly considered by the members of that Court and
laid to rest; therefore the likelihood of obtaining review on such an issue is all the
more diminished. This latter argument was suggested to the authors by Professor
Paul Mishkin of the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
6 17 See generally ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 572, § 334.
618 257 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 928 (1959).
19601
1216 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.108:1160
generally unimportant but nonetheless urged review to correct the alleged
injustice.
619
Often the lower court opinion contains a statement giving impetus to
the litigants to seek review. That recognition by the court that its decision
is in direct conflict with a state court or court of appeals adds immeasurably
to petitioner's confidence that he will succeed in reaching the Court was
revealed by several petitions.620 An expression by the court below of dis-
satisfaction with the rule laid down by the Supreme Court also encourages
petitioners to seek review.0 21 In this class are statements that a dissenting
Supreme Court opinion was "most persuasive"; 622 that "we are not at
liberty to disregard this binding precedent simply because a contrary view
may seem to reach a conclusion more in keeping with the realities of this
particular case"; 623 that "as a new question it is hard to see why
• ; 624 that "although the equities of this case strongly favor a recovery
by plaintiff, we conclude that under the pleadings and authorities
cited . *.".." 625 Similarly, lower court recognition of the absence of a
controlling Supreme Court decision will sometimes provoke a petition for
certiorari: "we have no clear-cut decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on
the supposed right to publish anonymously; two of their cases which may
bear on the question are conflicting"; 626 "the precise extent of [the] power
619 In addition to ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, op. cit. mupra note 572, § 334, petitioner
cited McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief Justice
Hughes, 63 HARv. L. REv. 5 (1949). This latter contains the following statement:
"The Chief had several purposes in going into the merits of a case on petition for
certiorari or the jurisdictional statement. First, he was interested in preventing
grave miscarriages of justice, and occasionally he would recommend the grant of
certiorari in a case of no public importance whatever simply because the decision
below was unjust, unreasonable, or plainly wrong." Id. at 13.
620 E.g., Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 260 F2d 929, 933 (5th Cir.
1958), rev'd, 361 U.S. 288 (1960) ; Seven-Up Co. v. Blue Note, Inc., 260 F.2d 584,
586 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. H.
Rouw Co., 258 F.2d 445, 448 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929 (1959);
Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 253 F.2d 957, 958 (2d Cir. 1958), rev'd, 359
U.S. 231 (1959).
621 "But in affirming the Court said: 'Although we know that Maggio cannot
comply with the order, we must keep a straight face and pretend that he can, and
must thus affirm orders which first direct Maggio "to do an impossibility, and then
punish him for refusal to perform"' Whether this be read literally as its deliberate
judgment of the law of the case or is something of a decoy intended to attract our
attention to the problem, the declaration is one which this Court, in view of its
supervisory powers over courts of bankruptcy, cannot ignore." Maggio v. Zeitz,
333 U.S. 56, 59 (1948).
622 Holeman v. Louisville & N.R.R., 319 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Ky. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 1012 (1959).
623 Deep Sea Tankers, Ltd. v. The Long Branch, 258 F.2d 757, 773 (2d Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 933 (1959).
624 United States Dredging Corp. v. Krohmer, 264 F.2d 339, 341 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 932 (1959).
625 Spector v. Pete, 157 Cal. App. 2d 432, 440, 321 P.2d 59, 64 (Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 822 (1958).
626 People v. Talley, 332 P.2d 447, 452 (Cal. Super. Ct 1958) (concurring
opinion), rev'd and remanded, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). The majority opinion stated:
"upon the precise question in issue, the United States Supreme Court has not spoken."
332 P.2d at 451.
THE COURT, THE BAR, AND CERTIORARI
to tax has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States." 627
In some states there is an appeal by right to the highest court of the
state when any judge below dissents. 628 Petitions alleging that the exist-
ence of a dissent should give rise to a grant of certiorari 629 indicate that
some petitioners believe a similar practice to exist in the federal system.
Quite apart from such erroneous beliefs, however, dissenting opinions con-
taining vigorous statements on federal questions may well provoke petitions
for certiorari. Two examples are assertions in dissent that the decision
constituted cruel and unusual punishment,6 30 and that the majority opinion
was contrary to a Supreme Court decision.
631
V. CONCLUSION
As a result of "quarrying in the hundreds of dreary petitions" placed
before the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1958, several conclusions
may be drawn regarding the performance of the interlocking functions of
the bar and the Court. Some petitions reveal either an inexcusably care-
less disregard of the criteria governing Supreme Court review or, at least,
a total ignorance of them. While a partial explanation of this phenomenon
may lie in pressure and incitement from clients frustrated in the lower
courts, the ultimate responsibility remains with the bar. And certainly
poor draftsmanship which fails to make lucid demonstration of how the
case meets the Court's criteria-a defect from which even some certworthy
petitions suffer--can be attributable only to the bar. On the other hand,
the Court's laborious task of picking the wheat from the chaff seems to
be performed with skill and adeptness. In addition to the rather obvious
selection between the totally unworthy and the clearly deserving petitions,
the Court must winnow out the poorly drafted but meritorious case from
those whose unimportance or frivolity is disguised by clever and skillful
drafting. Considering the generally unsatisfactory quality of the petitions
submitted by the bar, the Court selects cases for review with extraordinary
proficiency.
J. H. C.
H. C. G.
S. W. N.
627 Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 314, 323, 333
P.2d 323, 328 (1958) (concurring opinion), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1001 (1959).
628 E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 588.
629 E.g., United States v. Meadow Brook Club, 259 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 921 (1958); Central R.R. v. Jules S. Sottnek Co., 258 F.2d 85
(2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
630 People v. Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 425-28, 326 P.2d 457, 481-84, cert. denied,
358 U.S. 866 (1958).
63,1 Fugiani v. Barber, 261 F.2d 709, 713 (9th Cir. 1958), disnissed under Rule 60,
358 U.S. 924 (1959).
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